
PARENTS OF THE FIELD PROJECT.

Interviewee; Professor Tony De Reuck.

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Venue; East Sheen, London, England.

Interviewer; Dr. Chris Mitchell.

Chris: We're here at the home of our friend and colleague, Tony De Reuck, talking with him about the early days of peace and conflict studies... This is part of our "Parents of the Field" project. So, thank you for having us, Tony, and it's nice to be here again. My first question really is a fairly general one.

In the early days of "peace studies", conflict resolution, - whatever we're going to call it as a field [if it is a field] - people came into it from all sorts of different backgrounds - intellectual, personal, historical, discipline-wise. What was yours? How did you get first involved in this field and interested in it?

Tony DeReuck: I think I'd like to start rather obliquely by remarking that you were my teacher at the beginning and you have some responsibility for getting me into this fine mess !

Chris: I'm not sure I should acknowledge that - but okay.

Tony DeReuck: In the short-term, what happened was that I was editing a book for the CIBA Foundation where I worked which was a foundation for promoting international cooperation in medical research. And the book, which was about therapeutic drugs, was being produced by Jack Mongar - who was Professor of Pharmacology at University College [London] who was a Quaker - and by me, jointly.

And he began to talk about the way that international relations and conflict studies were both subjects taught in a totally different manner in Scandinavia and in the United States from the way in which they were taught in English or British universities. And this surprised me greatly. Jack had arranged with Lionel Penrose and - what was his name? Deary me. Cedric? Cedric Smith ! - who were both professors in the department of mathematics which was connected with the department of genetics at University College, to hold lunchtimes seminars on "aggression", mostly in animals, but

also the inheritance of aggressive behavior in human beings. And this resulted in them convening – the three of them, Mongar, Smith, and Penrose – convened an international symposium in Cumberland Lodge, which was a conference center in Windsor Great Park which was at the time at the disposal of University College. [I don't think it is any longer.]

To that conference were invited John Burton, who had been Permanent Head of the Australian Department of External Affairs, and also Johan Galtung from Oslo, and Kenneth Boulding from Colorado, and a host of other people. I didn't attend myself because I was much too busy with something else at the time, and its future significance was not, of course, apparent to me at that moment.

But Jack and I had discussed the conference, and I'd encouraged him to carry on with it, and it led to almost all that followed, in the sense that it convinced all those who attended- and a lot of people who heard about it but didn't attend - that something ought to be done about the way international relations in particular was handled in British universities as an academic subject.

Chris: Okay.

Tony DeReuck: The first thing that happened was that I was persuaded to hold a conference at the CIBA Foundation which would be recorded and published, as it was, indeed, under the title "*Conflict in Society*."

Chris: I remember.

Tony DeReuck: And a whole host of well-known names were invited to that conference, too. John Burton, of course, Kenneth Boulding. And if I may just glance at my notes, Harold Lasswell, Anatol Rapoport, Karl Deutsch, Bert Roling - and there were lots of others like Eric Trist, who are not so well-known in the field, but who was working at the Tavistock Institute of Human Relations at the time and who had, with Fred Emery, an important influence on what followed. That was how it began - in the short term, as it were.

Chris: Now what about the longer term, though? Can you talk about that?

Tony DeReuck: Well, I think that some of the people who may eventually hear your recording ought to know that I was born in 1923, which is 83 years ago, and the world was a very - astonishingly - different

place at that time. I am the son of a Belgian who came over to this country and married an English girl, my mother, during the First World War, and half the family are, therefore, on the continent.

And throughout my childhood, I had been very conscious both of the War of 1870, the German invasion of France, and of the War of 1914 which killed all my father's male cousins and sent my grandfather to prison for failing to declare that he had brass candlesticks that could be recycled into shell cases by the Germans who were occupying Ghent at the time. And his hair turned white and his teeth fell out while he was in prison.

And these things meant that war, for me, was a family matter to a degree that it was not for most Britons. Almost everybody I knew had lost a relative in the First World War, but they had lost them in distant parts somehow or other. And when I first went to Belgium, they were still restoring the ruins of the Cloth Hall in Ypres – or “Wipers”. And one way or another, it was a more intimate event - more than it would be for the average British schoolboy.

Now, all my generation at school were keenly conscious of two things, which are never referred to today, so far as I can remember. One was that there was an unspoken contract between men and women to the effect that in every generation, all men in Europe could expect to be “called to the colours” and to be involved in a war, which tended to recur every 20 or 30 years.

It was to be as expected that one would act as a soldier in war as it was expected that one would go to school, or, indeed, pay taxes. These things were inevitable. The second thing was that the contract between men and women was that men should fight the wars and women will put up with the pains of childbirth and rearing children.

It was spoken about among us at school that the division of roles between men and women rested on the two pains that the sexes would experience, inevitably in the normal course of events, and both of them had a lot to put up with. The women's were more extended because they either repeated childbirth or the pains of child rearing, which acknowledged to be quite considerable, went on for a long time, whereas wars were brief and terrible episodes.

On the other hand, the chances of being actually destroyed in a war, killed in a war, were slightly larger even in those days than that of dying in childbirth. Anyway, this view of life concentrated the mind wonderfully. In 1933, we spent a lot of time [with] the family, back in Belgium, and my grandfather's house looked out

onto the River Schelde, which was an artery of trade in Europe going joined up to the Rhine.

And down past the front windows of the house every day several ocean-going ships slid silently by, towed by tugs. And I remember in 1933 the first time a German ship came down past the house flying the swastika of the Third Reich and how all the people poured out of their houses to look at it, and how some of the women threw their aprons over their faces, and one or two of the older ones wept.

There was an expectation of war and a horror at what was going on in Europe, which extended from 1933 onwards and led to a total conviction that war was on the schedule. I must say that this has continued, of course, ever since 1945 until fairly recently when the Cold War standoff between East and West armed with nuclear weapons, was also in the minds of most people - not exactly all the time, but one was never free from being aware that war was in the air and that if it were to happen, it would be worse even than anything that had previously been experienced. Not to say, perhaps, the end of the human race.

The need to abolish war was a given for almost everybody for the greater part of my life. Almost everybody just gritted their teeth and got on with life. But I was singularly fortunate in meeting John Burton and also Joseph Rotblat - about whom we might talk a little later - both of whom gave me personally the opportunity of actually doing something about it instead of sitting in mourning of the inevitability of war and taxes.

Chris: So “war”, on the one hand, and “international relations, theories, and ideas” on the other. But tell a little more about yourself because this was the ‘30s, the war did come with its consequences, and how did you arrive at SEVA? Because I remember you talking, I think, about being at Imperial College [because you were there before you met me] and also [being] in the Air Force. So what’s the linkage between you as the schoolboy from that generation, and you as the executive at CIBA ?

Tony DeReuck: Well, I joined the RAF during the war as a meteorologist. I didn’t stay doing just meteorology [but] became liaison officer of the French Air Force because I was supposed to be able to speak French. On the basis of having matriculated, we called it in those days –

Chris: I remember.

Tony DeReuck: – but it turned out to be a perfectly reasonable job except that it involved the liaising with French officers who were in charge of the innumerable German prisoners which were taken in Northern France after D-Day where we were situated... in Britain. Not in Normandy, but in Britain. Anyway, yes, I messed about as an RAF bloke in the war, and finally got sent out to India, and [saw] the division of India - the Indian continent - into two states and the dreadful Civil War that broke out there.

Chris: So you were there during “Partition” then ?

Tony DeReuck: Yes, indeed. Yes, indeed. And I left on the day of partition as a part of a symbolic evacuation - with bands playing on the key in Bombay as we all left to go [thankfully] back to the United Kingdom - as a symbol of the relinquishment of power. What the hell am I supposed to be talking about ? Oh yes, what happened at – when I got home.

I graduated at Imperial College. And it so happened that the physics department where I worked was really dedicated to nuclear energy – or, rather, nuclear physics. Nuclear energy had just come on the agenda. And afterwards, I went into the Department of Chemical Engineering which might have equipped us – Marjorie, my wife, too, because we were both undergraduates at the same course and went into postgraduate work at the same time – might have equipped us for the nuclear power industry or, indeed, for the nuclear weapons industry.

But without making any conscious fuss about it, none of us felt that this was appropriate. And I went to work first as the editor of *Nature*, and then later as the deputy director of the CIBA Foundation for pharmaceutical research, and that’s how it all happened.

Chris: And then you teamed up with Jack Mongar and Cedric and with Dr. Penrose, all of whom [I think] were Quakers.

Tony DeReuck: They were. They were. And that’s very important.

Chris: Yes They’ve always had an enormous influence... in this country on issues of peace and war. I was going to ask you what attracted you to working in this field, but I think you’ve already answered that question anyway. So is there anything else you want to add?

Tony DeReuck: Well, one of the things that I had always felt, and a discussion with John Burton heightened this and made it very central to our

thinking, was that international relations as it was treated in most academic circumstances was regarded as a branch of history. It was treated as a chronicle of the crimes and follies of mankind. And it was governed by the oldest theoretical scheme in any of the intellectual studies, except music, it seems to me.

That is to say the doctrine of the “balance of power”, which dates back to Thucydides I called it the treason of the clerks. The intellectual community had come to regard this as a given, and it was never critically examined. The thesis of the balance of power - that the way to avoid war was either to be the most powerful player or to be allied to the most powerful player - is a self-fulfilling prophecy.

It led to mutual suspicion and hostility as a built-in norm of international relations throughout the whole of history and led to repeated, it seemed to us, to repeated war, which as I say, appeared to us to occur quite regularly in every generation. Inescapable because the intellectuals who wrote about history, who commented on it in the media, who discussed it in political circles, were all absolutely content to analyze all past and future situations and to base all policy on the doctrine of the balance of power.

The revision of that doctrine or at least the critical examination of that doctrine, and preferably the discovery of alternative schemes of fault and action were very high on the agenda. And this seemed to me to be one of the consequences of the Cumberland Lodge meeting that no alternative intellectual scheme was currently on offer, though glimpses of it – John Burton in particular had some very interesting things to say about this – glimpses of them were offered. But what we really needed was to sweep away the existing paradigm – to use a phrase, which I’m strongly opposed to – with something better.

Chris: So this was at the forefront of your mind in the early 1960s, then. ?

Tony DeReuck: Indeed.

Chris: And this was really the height of the Cold War and the kind of continuation of the warfare that you’ve actually talked about.

Let me just go back to one thing that you said about the discipline of international relations from which - I think - partly [this] research sprang. You talked about it as being really history. Do you think it’s become a discipline now? Do you think that it has changed and improved? What are your reflections on – what shall we say – 40 years of intellectual endeavor ?

Tony DeReuck:

That's a very interesting question. My feeling is that 100 half-hearted attempts may be observed in almost every edition of "*International Studies*" - or any of the leading publications in the field show tentative attempts. But nothing has been consolidated.

I must say that I was engaged in teaching international relations at the University of Surrey for 18 years, and during that time, my constant endeavor was to find ways of incorporating international relations into the social sciences and to understand what the social sciences really had to say. The social sciences are extraordinarily backward in one curious sense and that is that the people simply didn't cooperate.

Everybody is competitive with everybody else. But very few really try to build sure foundations upon which others can erect. I'm not sure why this is. In fact, it seems to me to be one of the tragedies of the century, the last century; that the social sciences ended up by neo-modernist rejection of the very basis of their own intellectual endeavors.

It amounted to the statement, it seemed to me the neo-modernist critique of international relations - and indeed, all political studies, and perhaps in all social science studies, - the critique amounts to the statement that all that one was doing was devising intellectual arguments for various political positions and that it was a self delusion to suppose that anything remotely resembling objective social science was intellectually feasible.

One was simply propagandizing, however unconsciously, for some position or other, radical or conservative; and this took the wind out of my sails and I think out of the sails of most people who were really intent on endeavoring to create a cumulative body of doctrine which would enable one, perhaps, to give wiser advice to either councils or policymakers.

I don't know still what the answer to all that is. But it does seem to me that it is a danger into which one falls in pursuing social science. That one is, in fact, finding almost theological arguments for backing one policy rather than another, or one set of policies, one attitude rather than another. But that renders the whole enterprise unfeasible and technically null and void from the start. [It] is one that I'm unable to refute, but totally unable to accept.

Chris:

Well, let's go back again to those early days because I want to go back to something Jack Mongar said and something that happened as a result of the Cumberland Conference... Jack, when you had talked about him, said [I think initially] that there were these great differences between the way in which international studies or

international relations were taught in the [United] States and in Scandinavia.

Tony DeReuck: Indeed.

Chris: And at that time, I think there was a big move in Scandinavia to ... rethink all of this. But that came about under the title of "peace research". Now, you also mentioned [that] the conference at Cumberland Lodge produced a whole series of organizational results, one of which was the Conflict Research Society.

Tony DeReuck: Yes.

Chris: So the Scandinavians talked about "peace" research and we started to talk about "conflict" research. Can you remember why it was... decided that you were doing, or were going to try to do, conflict research and the Scandinavians were doing peace research? Was there a reason? Were they different?

Tony DeReuck: There were differences, but I don't think this has got anything to do with the nomenclature. Nomenclature was a theme upon which we wasted an immense amount of time, talk, and spiritual energy. Because of the Cold War, the influence of communism as the danger - or, well, as "them rather than us" - belated every moment of academic discussion. And the word "peace," fantastically in Britain and American, had been commandeered by the left.

When we created the Conflict Research Society, there was a strong-minded faction who said, "Whatever anybody says, this ought to be called the Peace Research Society," and others of us said, "No. If you do that, you'll be regarded as a fellow traveler. You'll be regarded as having a political agenda from the start. The word 'Peace' will label you as being left wing.

"We must refer to "conflict" research, partly because it widens the scope so that it includes, for example, industrial conflict or urban/rural conflict, or, indeed, conflict between generations, which we certainly intend to include in the wingspan of the Society. But quite apart from anything else, it is injudicious to call ourselves peace research. We must call ourselves conflict research in order to escape being politically labeled."

Chris: So the label was different, but the content was pretty much the same ?

Tony DeReuck: Indeed. But may I just pursue that for a second?

Chris: Go ahead.

Tony DeReuck: The intellectual history of the middle ages, it seems to me, to be written in terms of the different ethos of the two leading intellectual groups in Christendom. The Dominican orders, on the one hand, and the Franciscans on the other. Both of them wanted to bed Christianity down both as a religion and as a sort of ideology throughout Europe, and that was their aim.

The Franciscans were idealists and their idea was that prayer and preaching among the population was the way to attack this problem. The Dominicans, on the other hand, thought that the only secure way of bedding Christianity down in Europe was to foster the universities and to create new ones. These would not only argue the case among themselves, but teach it to succeeding generations of elite groups, and that this was the way to transform and to secure the minds of the cultured elements of society.

Now all this was repeated before our very eyes in the creation of conflict research in Britain. There were the idealists who thought that the way to approach the abolition of war and to get rid of conflict was to join CND, the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, and that what one did was, on the one hand, preach and, on the other hand, posture in public in such a way as to attract public attention and the attention of the media.

On the other hand, there were another group of us who thought that the way to approach the problem was to secure a foothold in all the elements which made public opinion. That is to say, one should grasp the intellectuals - if they were allowed to use that term - to infiltrate the media, and to run the universities in such a way that an elite became aware of the alternatives to received wisdom. And this was played out in miniature in the arguments of those who founded the Conflict Research Society.

There were the sea green incorruptible Franciscans who said that we are a "peace" research society and we really want to nail our colors to the mast and declare who we are - and to do it, no matter what. And there were others, of whom I was one, who machiavellianly thought that we should perhaps attempt to grasp the leaders of power by stealth and to infiltrate the universities and the media.

And I may say that I thought that it would take a whole generation, at least, before this percolated down to the public, as it were. On the other hand, there were others who thought that one last heave and we shall get there.

Chris: Yes. Well, the interesting thing about that and about your point about labeling... is when it came to an *international* research association, it was the International *Peace* Research Association - which I think got set up at more or less the same time, didn't it? You had quite a considerable role in pushing that one as well.

Tony DeReuck: John Burton was also the founder of the International Peace Research Association. He had created something whose initials I remember spelled or pronounced the word "Coreapas." I cannot remember what C-O-R-E-A-P-A-S stood for. But it was an outfit, - a temporary council or a committee or something - which John created with a view to instituting what he called "a social science Pugwash". We can talk about Pugwash in a minute or two. But the point about it was that leaders in the social sciences, and in particular in the international political sciences, should meet regularly together and remake the discipline and, as I say, grasp the levers of intellectual power in the universities and schools and media and so on.

COREAPAS was lacking in support and money and everything, and I was in charge of the rooms at the CIBA Foundation in the Portland Place, behind the BBC. And John came, and on a number of occasions, he chaired meetings of COREAPAS, and one of the things that I was able to do was occasionally to pay for people like Anatol Rappaport and Karl Deutsch or Harold Lasswell to come over to join these discussions, of which there were very few.

They went on for perhaps less than a year. I attended all of them. And it wasn't quite clear to my mind precisely what was intended. It became apparent towards the end - and I'm going to put this as clearly as I can, and probably in a way that is a bit naughty - it seemed to me that what John wanted to do was to create a foreign service which was at the service of humanity and not of any particular state. It should not have in its mind's eye the national interest of anybody. It should have no interest except that of humanity as its driving force. And the creation of a scholarly community to back this endeavor was very high on the agenda. So -

Chris: So it was an invisible college.

Tony DeReuck: Exactly so. Yes, the invisible college is, indeed, the term that frequently came to mind. Well, Bert Roling, who was a jurist in Holland who had sat on the war crimes trials in Japan as a judge - Bert Rolling was very interested in this programme. He joined

COREAPAS and whatever COREAPAS meant, and eventually – not eventually, after a very short time, six months, maybe a year, it came to fruition even before the Conflict Research Society.

Chris: Oh, so it preceded it ?

Tony DeReuck: I have a notion that it preceded it by a month or so. I'm not sure.

Chris: So this would be about 1960 –

Tony DeReuck: This is 1963. And I think IPRA held its first inaugural meeting in Groningen to which John and I and everybody on your list practically –

Chris: Everybody who was anybody !

Tony DeReuck: Groningen was the town where the university in which Bert Roling taught was situated. And the meeting was planned in London in the CIBA Foundation with John participating and being the driving force behind it. And his intention was that the International Peace Research Association should be a conspiracy, and - being tendentious and deliberately - should be a conspiracy of teachers and practitioners in diplomacy to rewrite the ground rules of international relations outside the balance of power paradigm.

And when we went to Groningen, it turned out that all the university people there were really intent on producing an international union, of which there were a great number, and international scientific, international humanistic unions are really sort of unique and small. They were proposing something rather different than from what John really had in mind. And John went along with it. He drove it. Bert Roling took it over and shaped it into something much less ambitious, but more feasible.

Again, it was the idealist Franciscan versus the concrete-minded Dominican, and eventually International Peace Research Association - about whose title I remember no particular argument, strangely enough. It may have happened, but I don't actually know why it didn't. It was partly because the British were not the most numerous. And it may be that in the Continent of Europe particularly, "peace" was not associated with Russia, rather than with –

Chris: - Russian front organizations, I think.

Tony DeReuck: Yes.

Chris: Now two things keep coming up in what you're saying about these very crucial early days in the early 1960...one is "social science" and the attempt to take a more "scientific" approach to international relationships and all that. And the other is the model of "Pugwash", and that becomes something which crops up not only in what you're saying, but what in several other people are saying. So tell us a bit about how that model became influential and how it actually had an effect on the field.

Tony DeReuck: Pugwash arose out of the Russell-Einstein declaration of 1955. Bertrand Russell and Albert Einstein published a short letter, a public declaration made by them to all scientists to the effect that it was the moral duty of all those in the scientific world to use their influence and to guide governments into peaceful paths. This was a result, of course, of the Manhattan Project and the production of the [atomic] bomb during the war.

Now one of the most influential people in my life, and one of the most influential people in the growth of the whole business of peace research and the creation of Pugwash, was Joseph Rotblat who was a Polish Jew who had escaped, or rather who had come to England to work in the University of Liverpool in the month before the war broke out. His family were left behind, in particularly his wife, because she was ill. He obviously didn't anticipate the speed at which things were going to happen, and he never saw his family again. The German invasion of Poland wiped them off the map.

Joseph Rotblat was a nuclear physicist who worked with Chadwick, who discovered the neutron in the University of Liverpool, and was whipped into the Manhattan project for making the bomb. He went over to the United States and took part in the manufacture or the invention of the bomb in the first instance, and he was the only one in all those who were involved who when the bomb was actually tested, before it was used, when it was actually tested, he said, "Right." He got up and resigned and left.

He believed that it should never be used. He believed that the demonstration that it was possible was quite sufficient to deter, and that it should never be used against any enemy whatsoever. He was, of course, immediately placed under surveillance by all the secret services, and it was greatly feared – Poles, after all, are only 100 miles or so from the Russians, although the Poles and the Russians have been enemies for thousands of years. But they suspected, naturally, that he was going to defect. However, it became apparent that he wasn't, and he was allowed to come back

to this country and resume his university jobs over here. This is in 1945.

Ten years later, Russell and Einstein proposed that the scientific community should do whatever it could to moderate the intransigence of politicians. And a meeting was held in the little fishing village of Pugwash on the coast of Nova Scotia, financed by a Canadian millionaire called Cyrus Eaton, and Joe Rotblat and another dozen or so nuclear physicists all of whom were in the business of advising the several powers that had already embarked on the manufacture of bombs.

That's to say there were those from the United States, from France, from China, and from Britain. I think that's the lot at the time. All of those convened in Pugwash to discuss what might be done to obviate the use of bombs. And so the Pugwash "movement" was generated. The Pugwash movement would hate to be described in this way. But nevertheless, it seems to me to be the most graphic and clear way of describing it.

What it aimed to do was to capture and convert those who advised governments on nuclear policy, on the manufacture of weapons, and perhaps even on energy policy, to capture them to form a group of people in a – well, I was going to say "conspiracy" – to offer governments everywhere similar advice which would calm them all down so that the Russians and the American governments would receive parallel views in such a way as to prevent the escalation of ill relations, and, indeed, to result [they hoped initially] in the total abolition of nuclear weapons, and the total concentration on nuclear power - which they foresaw would be necessary when the oil ran out - and to advise, in the meantime, of such things as disarmament.

Meetings of nuclear scientists, called now "Pugwash Conferences on Science in World Affairs," were held annually ever since 1957. At first, they were quite small meetings of a couple of dozen people, but they rapidly escalated. And before long, other people joined in and said, "You can't do this without removing the causes of war," and one of the causes of war is the gross disparity in capacity between the first and the third world, so that what we must also have is a parallel meeting - or a meeting at the same time as the nuclear specialists - of economists and others who would discuss the development of Latin America, of Africa, and Asia so that powerless countries, governments, which had no hope of generating nuclear power, let alone nuclear weapons, were rapidly drawn in until the conferences which started at, say, 30, rapidly extended to 300, and may well have gone far beyond that

I'm not sure how large the meetings grew, but they were certainly in the order of 300 in the end. And I had joined Pugwash as soon as I heard about it, which was in the very early '60s.

Chris: Could one just join, or did you have to have –?

Tony DeReuck: No, you had to be invited. You had to be invited. I was invited because I had been trained as a nuclear physicist. Because I was known to Joe Rotblat and all the other people involved because they had belonged to the CIBA Foundation for one thing and another. And I think it was probable it grew out of simply social contacts in the first instance.

I don't actually remember what really happened except to say this, that in the CIBA Foundation we had sums of the order of £1 million to spend on research every year, and this led to those who dispensed this largesse having enormous prestige and power. And one of the things they needed was a limited company to give Pugwash - which was an international movement - legal form, so that it could employ people, it could own buildings and offices and typewriters and computers and all the rest of it, and I was just the sort of bloke who was supposed to know about this sort of stuff.

So I very soon was invited to become a director of Pugwash, Limited, which does nothing except give Pugwash a legal entity which enables it to rent buildings and employ staff. And I was a director of Pugwash, Limited - the only director of Pugwash, Limited, to my recollection, who was not a Nobel Prize winner. There were half a dozen of us. And we met once a year and went through the motions for legal purposes of appointing accountants and clearing accounts and all this sort of thing. But it simply enabled us to do all the other things – or enabled Pugwash to do all the other things. Now Pugwash was run by Rotblat from London... it had a council, which was international, in which everybody was represented, all the countries of consideration in Europe.

And the headquarters eventually settled in Rome and have fairly recently moved to the United States to - I think - New York or Washington. I think it's New York, actually. But the point was that the ideas and the central direction, however, cack-handedly, emanated from Joe Rotblat in a little office in London - a very tiny office, smaller than this room.

And that was absolutely crammed with books and papers all over the floor, rickety chairs, a big desk, and Joe sitting behind it.

And that's what I tried to be - Joe's right-hand man, his man Friday.

Chris: Did you have an official title?

Tony DeReuck: No, no, no, no, no. Well - just a member of the committee. But all the other members of the committee were even older than - well, much older than I. They were people like Rudolf Peierls, for example, yes. Rudolf Peierls was another German refugee, Jewish refugee who was entirely influential in inventing the bomb. He worked at Oxford, I think.

And by the time - well, he was an elderly man while I was the office boy, and he was typical of a lot of others. They all... were famous physicists who had had great influence on the progress of science, who were the other directors of this, that, and the other in Pugwash. And they had frequent very, very good ideas on what to do, about who to entrain, who to invite, who to get to talk about this, that, and the other.

But the conferences insofar as they were successful, were mainly concerned with thinking about bombs. The parts which were thinking about the development of the third world and so on were - to my mind - epiphenomena which had no lasting influence on affairs.

Chris: So Pugwash served as a model for peace research...conflict research. Was there much more cross-fertilization than that?

Tony DeReuck: I think there was very little cross-fertilization. Let me give you an idea of what Pugwash was able to do successfully. You may recall that probably in the '60s - probably in the early '60s, there was the problem of the baby teeth. The deciduous teeth, the baby teeth that come out, put under the pillow for the tooth fairy - when these were examined for radioactivity, they were found to incorporate radioactive strontium throughout the Northern Hemisphere. Every child in the Northern Hemisphere from 'round about 1955 to around about 1970, I should think - '65 anyway, had radioactive teeth, and this was published. It became apparent to mothers that their children were drinking milk which was contaminated.

Well, you can imagine that when mothers throughout the - I was gonna say throughout the Northern Hemisphere, but since the British tested bombs in Australia, it must have affected Australian children as well - Australasian children as well, I suppose. You can imagine that being told that their children were radioactive was crucifying for millions of women.

They were, of course, reassured that the amount of radioactivity was negligible, that it would lead perhaps 1 in 100,000 developing cancer later in life - or something like that, - but the teeth fell out and they were all right. It wasn't true, of course, because the second harvest of teeth also were radioactive. But the radioactive level was so low that it is doubtful that it actually impaired the health of many children.

Nevertheless, it was appalling for the population - for the women in particular. So great pressure was brought to bear on British, American, and Russian authorities to stop testing their bombs. And each of those governments pronounced themselves unable to stop testing because were they to do so, the other two would instantly redouble their efforts and get the march on them.

So a balance of power argument emerged for continuing testing. It was proposed that future tests should be held down mines, not in the atmosphere, but down deep shafts in the earth. This was objected to by all three governments on the grounds that concealed testing of bombs by somebody else would enable them to steal the march anyway.

And although this was technically feasible - and, indeed, advisable - it ceased to be possible for us to say, "We have done 12. All right, you who have only done 11, you can do another one to come up in parity with us." That sort of trading was the sort of thing that went on in diplomatic circles at the time. A meeting was held - I'm not sure when, but in the 1960s - I'm afraid I haven't looked it up - in Oxford of the Pugwash Group.

And a Russian seismologist, an earthquake expert, turned up and said, "I can prove that it is impossible to test a bomb, however small, anywhere on the earth without everybody knowing about it. You have to use seismographs." Nobody had thought about this before. And it was the Russian who made it possible for all the governments who had nuclear weapons to test to be advised by their advisors that, "We can stop testing in the atmosphere. We can test down mines and shafts under earth. And it is impossible for anybody to test even a tiny bomb without everybody in the rest of the world knowing about it within 48 hours."

This enabled the Atmospheric Test Ban Treaty to be signed by everybody. No bombs were to be tested in the atmosphere thereafter. Deciduous teeth ceased to be radioactive. Bomb testing continued, but down mine shafts. Other similar things were debated in Pugwash and arguments were mustered to show that it was unnecessary or inadvisable to test under water, which would

ruin the seas and perhaps kill any infinite number of fish, that nuclear underwater mines should never be produced.

Rockets were okay, but mines were ruled out because of the ecological damage that they would do in being tested. It was agreed in Pugwash that no bombs should be placed in space. That's to say you can't put a rocket up, or rather a satellite up [holding a] bomb or bombs which could be released in time of trouble, which was, of course, seriously considered by everybody. No bombs were to be placed in the Antarctic or the Arctic.

There may be other things. I forget. But those are the sorts of things which Pugwash was able to persuade governments to regard as likely to be *casus belli* rather than deterrents. The "star wars" business - the proposal to shoot down rockets in flight and to develop the technology capable of doing this - was also discussed endlessly in Pugwash. And some moderation of that program was - for a while - achieved. But this has now broken down again, and what was at the time described as "star wars", is really back on the agenda - though, because it's not perceived as part of the Cold War, but as part of a general technological advance which we, of course, - Russians, Americans, British, French - would never dream of using [except when provoked] it hasn't upset people to the extent that it might have done.

Chris: Well, it's beginning to upset some people, anyway !

Tony DeReuck: Oh, indeed. Oh, indeed. I think that Pugwash has succeeded over a number of things by putting them on the agenda and finally persuading governments that they were unnecessary.

Chris: Tony... it seems to me that, at the very least - as far as Pugwash is concerned - one can look back and say, "Yes, it's had a number of successes and some partial successes in getting its ideas over and accepted. It's very difficult, I think, even with the best will in the world, to look back on the achievements of conflict research or peace research ... and point to similar successes in getting ideas accepted - or is that an overly cynical view? What do you think?"

Tony DeReuck: I actually think that peace research has had a greater effect than people realize. One of the things, for example, whenever the situation in Palestine and Israel is considered, one talks about "the peace process", the idea that confidence building measures and that schemes for cooperation between Greeks and Turks in Cyprus, or between Catholics and Protestants in Ulster, all use the vocabulary

of peace research and they endeavor to use the ideas. And these ideas are no longer regarded as pure idealism and nonsense.

They're discussed in Parliament using the vocabulary that we put into circulation quite seriously as useful, but not definitive. And I think that it has altered the tone of diplomacy in really serious conflicts. The spectacular results in South Africa are not, unfortunately, to be attributed to our efforts, it seems to me.

I'm aware of a great many initiatives that were undertaken for South Africa, particularly by the Foundation of International Conciliation... but I'm not aware that they're actually bore fruit in what finally followed. And what finally followed, it seemed to me, was due to a few charismatic individuals and Christian initiatives.

I'm rather the view incidentally, that all John Burton has done is rooted – he would deny it, I think, – was rooted in the fact that his father was to Australia what John Wesley was to Britain. He was the great Methodist Christian minister.

Chris: Yes. I've heard Australians talk about the Burtons – I mean, the two of them. Let me push you a bit more on that, though, because what you seem to be saying is that the Dominicans were right and the Franciscans were wrong. Is that being unfair?

Tony DeReuck: No. I think that neither could have succeeded without the other. But that I would always put my own effort into the organizational proposal. It did seem to me that – well, putting it very simply and crudely, if Pugwash had been taken over by CND, it would have been inaudible to governments thereafter and would never have been able to persuade the powers-that-be and the establishment that they should be listening to them.

I do think that CND had an effect – a benign effect - in educating the last mass of the population so that even those who were conservatively inclined and tended to dismiss [the movement] were aware of the issues even if they didn't [agree with the strategy.]

Being a Dominican myself, I'm inclined to assent to that proposition. But I don't think that's what I really want to say. Neither the Dominicans nor the Franciscans would have prevailed without the other. One of the dangers that Pugwash thought it experienced was the risk of being taken over, of being adopted by CND. If that had happened, I fancy that Pugwash would have become inaudible to government.

The reason why Pugwash was able to talk to government was, on a whole, because it eschewed publicity, because there was no question of blaming the government for not listening to them. All

that sort of thing never arose. It was a constant drip, drip, drip of advice, a constant provision of lengthy and rather dull papers to government circles, perhaps through Chatham House, but more often directly from Pugwash to the Ministry of Defence or to the Foreign Office, and to, of course, the corresponding institutions in other countries. I think they each needed the other, but that what was absolutely essential was that there should be establishment figures arguing to other establishment figures in opposition to current practice.

Chris: Well – so, Dominicans 5, Franciscans 5 ?

Tony DeReuck: D'accord. Yes, I agree with that, yes.

Chris: Okay. Let me change tack a bit and go back to you - and you in the early 1960s and what was happening in the 1960s and subsequently.... One of the questions we always ask people is, "Who, looking back, has been influential [on the way you] think and thought about the field and what needs to be done... Who else do you think was influential on you at this particular time? Who impressed you? You talked about college and the Bouldings, but who, particularly?"

Tony DeReuck: I felt the need to incorporate international relations into social sciences generally. And what particularly worried me was – what I mean by social sciences and who are the people to whom to pay attention within that field.

Now, Marjorie and I were invited to Yale for an extended visit, and Karl Deutsch and half a dozen other people there. That visit had a tremendous feeling. I'd already met these people in conferences, for instance... and although I think that it is in general true that meeting someone is worth a month of reading his works, nevertheless, there are a lot of people whose works have influenced me immensely and who are not, generally speaking, supposed by others in the field to have any relevance. Let me tell you how it came about. At the CIBA Foundation, we held regular conferences consisting of about two dozen people who stayed for a week, five days, and talked about a particular subject at the top of their [list of interests]. They were "invisible colleges" made visible for a week. And I convened half a dozen of these meetings every year, decided who should invitees, and what they should talk about or would be encouraged to talk about...And I got down to analyzing what happened when they came. Physicists tend to count and measure, and I counted and measured. And there's one

particular thing that emerged from these analyses which was extraordinarily influential with me and gave me an idea of what a full-blooded social science ought to be like. I counted the number of times, or the amount of time that each individual attendee at a conference spoke and I discovered to my absolute amazement that there was a perfectly regular thing that cropped up time and time again.

Putting it very simply and rather falsifying the [complexity] in a sense, in a nine-man meeting... if you line up the nine fellows in order of their [contribution] one [talks the most], another second, third, fourth, fifth, sixth. If you'll arrange in order of time, you'll find that at first the most talkative man speaks for 100 minutes. The second will speak for 50. The third will speak for 25. The fourth for 12. The fifth for six. The seventh for three. The eighth for one half minute, and the ninth for only three quarters of a minute.

... What I'm trying to say is that at a free meeting at which the chairman doesn't allocate time officiously to various people – he may say, “You've talked too much, 100 minutes....Joe down here has only spoken for three minutes. Let him have a go.”

If you have a quiescent chairman and a sort of market developments among the people concerned, the relationship between them is governed by a mathematical regularity which I've found was enshrined in the books as Pareto's Law. Pareto said that the income in any free market is likely to be distributed in the same way. That's why the poor are always with us, because the leading chaps will have 150, and a long tail of people will have six, three, one and a half. And this is the result in a competitive market of interactions between people, not guided by authority.

Chris: So, in your case, competitive for time.

Tony DeReuck: Competitive for time, yes. Or, actually, competitive for status in the group. Competitive for being heard by the others. Being allowed to talk...

It was a meeting about where WHO should site an epidemiological. They wanted – the WHO did – to site this center which was to be in a purpose-built building inhabited by doctors of all stripes and nationalities, paid out of the United Nations which meant that they [would be paid at] a very high rate. And the British government resisted this fiercely to everybody's astonishment.

They said that the people who were invited to work for the epidemiological research center would be privileged among other doctors in this country so that everybody would stream into the

center if they could... and that it would create an elite in the country who were paid anything up to four or five times as much because they didn't [pay] taxes, and one way or another it would ruin British medicine. And so the discussion was where this thing was to be sited, and Rome and New York and Buenos Aires and everywhere was considered. And the British authorities resisted it and the talks went on and on and on. And I did this thing with them, too, analyzing the rate at which people talked.

And I came to the conclusion based on the experience with the... meeting, that when an agreement was eventually reached or was approaching, the dynamics of the group changed... they began to talk to one another as a single group as opposed to pro-Rome, pro-Buenos Aires, anti-New York [factions] - that sort of thing. And one way and another, I became convinced that I knew more about the group dynamics of negotiating meetings than was in the books.

I afterwards learned that a great deal of this is in the books though it has never been applied to diplomatic negotiations.

But, one day after we had held the meeting at the CIBA Foundation on *Conflict in society*, John Burton came to me and said, "Right. Now we know we're about conflict. Let's go and stop a war." Thinking that this was pub talk and just jocular nonsense, I said, "Yeah. All right. Which one would you choose?" And he said, "Indonesia and Malaysia. They are at war Let's summon a meeting of those chaps and see what we can do."

And I said, "[If we can get them] together. I will see what can be done about putting them on [at one of the rooms in the CIBA Foundation.]"

Chris: So this was '65, I think.

Tony DeReuck: That's right, '65 - or it may have been the end of '64 that this conversation actually [took place]. John wrote to Indonesia, the Malaysians and Singaporeans and suggested that they should [meet]. If by any chance it led to any powerful propositions for calling off trouble, the war, then [it would be successful] If not, then nothing had happened. Nobody lost face, because they had one little peace conference and had failed to bring home the bacon.

I don't actually know... and I don't actually remember today what the letter said. But it was an invitation on a personal basis to his friends to come and talk about the predicament. For a whole year, nothing happened and I was not surprised because I didn't think anything would happen.

But Fred Emery from the Tavistock Institute, came – he was an Australian incidentally, and knew John, I suppose, rather well – came to me one day in the office and said, “[John} hasn’t received a response to his invitation that I really think it’s effecting his health,” and I was astonished.

And Fred and I got into a taxi at his insistence, and we went round to the Indonesian Embassy and the High Commissioners of Singapore and Malaysia and we[managed] to see the first secretary or somebody, and it was very difficult to get a hearing at all. “What the hell do you think you’re doing?” But they weren’t busy, these people. And the quickest way to get rid of us was to actually produce somebody. And eventually, we got a hearing from each of the three of them and they all said we had [already been] talking about [the conflict] - we don’t know [what you think you can do] We went away, and within five days, we had telegrams from each of the countries saying [they would come].

I was utterly appalled ... I couldn’t think what we were going to do... I was able to persuade the Director [of the CIBA Foundation] that I should use the Foundation for housing this meeting, if necessary putting up any diplomat who needed putting up.

As it came to it, they didn’t. They all went back to their embassies or high commissions at night. And they came, in the first place, for a week to discuss confrontation. And John, busy lad as he was, said he wanted Roger Fisher and a whole host of other people – I’m afraid I’ll have to look up their names now – but nearly all the future members of CAC. I think John Groom. I’m not sure.

Chris: Possibly.

Tony DeReuck: You weren’t there?

Chris: No.

Tony DeReuck: It was before your time.

Chris: It was before my time. Roger Fisher certainly was.

Tony DeReuck: Roger Fisher was there, yes., The three [rival] powers sent three people each, one of whom was a spokesman and the other two were his sidekicks who sat behind him and whispered in his ear. John provided the names of another eight or nine people, including

people who had to be brought in from Australia. There was an Australian – sorry, a Chinese anthropologist, Australian nationality who came over who was very familiar with the position on the ground.

They say that the war was a fighting war. Britain was the high-protecting power for both Singapore and Malaysia, which meant that we provided Gurkha troops to fight the war with British officers. But the casualties in British terms were negligible with the result that...particularly in the British press, there was no distress. Although Britain was actually engaged in this war, there was no distress among the general public because their boys went off in danger

Well, one of the things that happened, John fastened me into the chair. John wanted to devise an agenda and stick to it rigidly, and to conduct the meeting. He was going to chair the meeting through me, if you see what I mean. But he didn't want himself to be in the chair because he wanted to be the leading spokesman, or the leading activist. during the course of the meeting. But, I declined to do this and it formed – we had a moment of extreme tension and a spat between us.

I said I knew more about meetings of this sort. He had taken part in negotiations at the end of the war... But I [refused to] chair this meeting in the usual way... And John, in a paddy, eventually agreed, because time ran out. I remember tearing up a piece of paper in which he had laid out the agenda and dropping the bits in the waste paper basket in front of him, and him being white with fury. They came and...we sat down round the table, and I explained to them that this was going to be a meeting at which we would simply explore the options and that their role was to provide information to the Socratic questioning of the social scientists that had also been invited. And one of the first things we were not going to do was to draw up an agenda.

Chris: That must have shaken them.

Tony DeReuck: Everybody scowled and all three of them then announced that they would go home. If it was going to be like this, they would attend for the first day just to see what it was like, but that they would not return on the following day. And after an hour or so, Roger Fisher suddenly announced that he didn't agree with the way the meeting was being conducted, that another chairman should be elected and that the meeting should be run properly in a lawyer-like fashion.

Chris: Yes. Which, of course, he was.

Tony DeReuck: Exactly. He was a professional of international law at the time and I managed to resist this. And afterwards, Roger Fisher came and said, "I see you do actually know what you're doing." I thought, "This is absolutely foolish." He said it very reluctantly and it was by no means to be accounted as praise. But at least he thought it was tolerable.

Well, at the end of the day, they all went away and we said, "We will reconvene at 9:00 tomorrow morning," and they all said, "No, we shan't be back." But at 9:00 tomorrow morning, all three were back. And so it went on for seven days, maybe more. It may have been ten. I think it was actually ten days.

And then they did go home and reconvened at their request a month or so later, and so it went on. I think there were three or perhaps four meetings of the same people. Most of the social scientists were able to come back, but not all because some of them had university terms and things like that to contend with. And so the numbers did decrease a little.

We reported to Harold Wilson, who was then [British] Prime Minister what we were doing. And for a long while, I had a letter from Harold Wilson which we showed around to people which said, "You're bloody mad, but more power to your elbow," in his own handwriting in ink on a piece of No. 10 notepaper. I don't know what happened to that note. I hope John has it. I doubt it, actually. John doesn't keep things.

Chris: John doesn't keep things, no.

Tony DeReuck: But it was my pride and joy for a short while.

Chris: It couldn't be the CIBA archives, could it?

Tony DeReuck: No, no.

Chris: Oh, pity.

Tony DeReuck: The CIBA Foundation repudiates the recollection of these things as being De Reuck's effort to embezzle funds for things in which he was interested, but we are no ! It was not, after all, pharmaceutical research.

Chris: That's true. So how did it end?

Tony DeReuck: Well, it ended with President Soekano being ousted by President Suharto in a coup that occurred, I think, in 1967... I thought that that was the end of it. We had undoubtedly produced a draft agreement] between the three countries - though it was very sketchy and it needed the details filling in to an enormous extent.

None of them agreed. Each of them said, "Yes. Well, those bits are suitable for the other two, and not for me." Suharto took over from Soekano. He found this paper in the Foreign Office in Indonesia and almost immediately suggested to the other two that they should convene a meeting on [Manila in the] Philippines to resume talks.

And what in fact happened was that they almost immediately arrived at the same document more or less that we had fleshed up in London. It was part of the agreement that we should be totally secretive about this, that it should never be published, that they had been assisted in reaching this conclusion by practically dead white men.

They were going to acquire all the kudos for having reached the conclusion themselves, if there was any kudos. And, of course, Suharto was able to say Soekarno was a dead loss. "Here am I, new to office and I have immediately made peace which must be for the benefit of all of us. And it just shows that I'm a very good president."

Chris: Which he kept saying for the next 30 years.

Tony DeReuck: Just so. Just so.

Chris: That was the beginning of "controlled communication" and "problem solving and workshops"...

Tony DeReuck: In the following year, we tried the same with Cyprus - and you were certainly present for that.

Chris: Yes, I was.

Tony DeReuck: And... that was very fraught because I think it was the Greeks who maintained that...he woke up in the morning and found a grave dug in his front garden.

Chris: No. I think it was Umit Suliman ...

Tony DeReuck: It was the Turk who claimed - was it? I forget. I shall have to look it up.

Tony DeReuck: And we got them to agree that if they didn't agree internally, that eventually that Turkey would probably intervene in the dispute. And, indeed, the Turkish invasion of the island followed and they were on the verge, it seemed to me, of seeing that prudence and self-interest would be best served by reaching some quite simple agreements about the sharing of responsibility.

Chris: Among themselves.

Tony DeReuck: Among themselves.

Chris: Without Athens or Ankara getting involved, of course. That didn't actually work out. One of my memories about that time – about you particularly, and this is going back to the discipline or the study of the field becoming a social science - was that you...were very interested at that point not just in the structure or process of meetings, but also...in anthropology and what anthropology could say to conflict analysts and conflict resolvers.

I remember you had a very bright anthropology student who had a degree in anthropology, and you and she were constantly trying to persuade the rest of us that anthropology held the key to very many [problems]. Where did that come from? Where did your interest in anthropology come from?

Tony DeReuck: Well, at the time, I was treasurer of the Royal Anthropological Institute.

Chris: You're a physicist !

Tony DeReuck: Exactly. I had no anthropological background. No, this is not quite true. While I was in India at the end of the war, I had become very interested in Indian anthropology, and let us not dwell on that. I'll just tell you one little anecdote.

In the course of following up the anthropology of the Indian situation, I went to a leper colony at a place called Mango Pier, which is near Karachi in what is now Pakistan. And it's a shrine where a holy man died in the 13th Century and the life switch fell out of his hair when he did, turned into crocodiles, and they inhabited a pool there which was sacred to this chap's memory. And the crocodiles had to be maintained by regular sacrifices of sheep, by the local priesthood, and it's still to this day so done. The pool is filled with crocodiles. They breed like crocodiles ! And it was apparently an extraordinary thing. Khalim Siddique,

with whom I shared an office in University College London when I went to do the degree there, had visited Mango Pier when a the child, when he was very ill, he had – a miracle had occurred and a sort of a Lourdes phenomenon, and he had recovered from his illness because of the priests and the crocodiles and the pool and the holy man who had died there. Anyway, I'm sorry. That was extraordinary convoluted. Khalim Siddique was, of course, one of the group who graduated at the same time and he died, alas, prematurely. Perhaps it was just as well, or he might have turned out to be on the wrong side in... the present problem.

Now, I had been invited to become treasurer of the Royal Anthropological Institute for the same reason that I had had influence on all sorts of things like COREAPAS and that I was known as the bod who was a sort of social scientist, who had lots and lots of money and influence and friends and things, "and so please come and rescue us."

And the Anthropological Institute had premises and a library in Bedford Square. The rent had suddenly quadrupled overnight when the century-old lease ran out, and they were suddenly bankrupt. I was asked to take over and to rescue them from dissolution. The first thing I suggested was that we sold the library to the University of the Houston, in Texas for £3 million, which was the agreed value of the library, and that the £3 million should be then spent in photographing all the books so that we retain the books – not the books, but the images. And we'd inquired how much this would cost and they said between three quarter of a million pounds, so that was out. What in the end we did was to pawn the library off on the British Museum with the sole proviso that the fellows of the Royal Anthropological Institute should be able to borrow books which they cannot do from the British Museum in any other context.

And I got to know Mary Webb, who was then director of the British Museum library, and we arranged this sleight of hand. And the Society moved into hired premises elsewhere...and we eventually managed to escape from penury.

All this led me to being very interested in the anthropological input into peace research. The problem is this, in almost every case you have to say to the whole population to drop their hatred of research. This is an anthropological problem. It's a cultural problem. How do you covert a whole population? And what are there in populations which lead to their generating a distaste for another population which they frequently have no knowledge, not really. They've never really met. But nonetheless, this becomes

the guiding principal, both for them individually as citizens, and for the government.

I devised eventually a whole way of taking account of social structure and...elements of culture in a single complicated way of thinking about things, which I published with the greatest difficulty. And this is an interesting thing to my mind.

Whenever I've tried to publish anything, for example, on "controlled communication", I was told by [the editors of] *International Relations* that it wasn't international relations. Negotiation is not part of international relations. I tried them in political science journals and they said, "Oh, this is international relations. You don't do negotiations like this is ordinary political science. We don't think that you're applying to the right journal." I tried in sociological journals and they said, "No, this is politics.

And one way and another, I had the greatest difficulty in getting stuff published. A journal called *International Interactions* arose for a few years in the United States. It had a strong German input. I attended a meeting in Germany at which I made a spectacular presentation and they invited me to become one of the editors, so called, of *International Interactions*, and I began to publish my stuff there. When you go, I will give you one of my papers. They're impossible to read. They are a condensation of an entire book into 30 pages. And they're technical to a degree... I write as a physicist rather than a sociologist, and it doesn't go. It doesn't persuade.

Chris: But... I remember you publishing a couple of articles about controlled communication in basically...ethnographic journals. There was one called – not *The Human Condition* – ?

Tony DeReuck: Yes, that's right, *The Human Condition*. Yes, yes, that's right.

Chris: And there was another one in *Man, Society Time* and something or other.

Tony DeReuck: Yes, that's right, - precisely.

Chris: I've still got those.

Tony DeReuck: They're very curious journals which finally had agreed to take them, yes.

Chris: But very cross-disciplinary –

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- Tony DeReuck: Yes. None of them was read, of course, by other people in our field.
- Chris: No... You're right. It was not somewhere you would automatically go.
- Tony DeReuck: The people with whom you had conversations about how sad it was that we hadn't "broken through" are right, in one sense. But in another sense, I think that it has actually influenced everybody's vocabulary...including the practitioners...
- Chris: There's a question we asked about what you think were some of the key ideas in developing peace and conflict studies... I'm going to ask you about key figures, then ask you about key ideas... and then about problem-solving workshops and then about hopes and dreams, and then about the future... The personal thing I was going to ask you is: What's happened to Jack Mongar these days? Is he still around?
- Tony DeReuck: We don't know. We lost contact with him, oh, ages and ages ago, 15 years ago, and no idea where he is or anything about him... He may be dead, of course. He was at least as old as I am.
- Chris: But... you told me, I think, he was up for an FRS, wasn't he, at one time?
- Tony DeReuck: Yes, he was. He was the only bloke we have ever heard of who was put for election as Fellow of the Royal Society and turned it down on modesty grounds...
- Chris: Tony, looking back at these early days, and since then... who do you think were some of the... seminal figures in the development of the field? We've talked about John [Burton]. We've talked about Joe Rotblat. You mentioned Kenneth [Boulding]. Who do you think were really very influential in those early days of getting the thing started?
- Tony DeReuck: Well, the name that immediately springs to mind - and not a big sort of way - was Mike Nicholson. who was director of the Richardson Institute and of the Conflict Research Society. He was honorary secretary in its very earliest days. His interest was not centrally on I would say negotiation or conflict resolution in its purest sense. His interest was on conflict analysis and gaming
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theory and he was an economist by trade, and his interest was very empirical and mathematical, as it were.

Whereas, the people who flourished as mediators or as conciliators were – I was going to say humanists. That’s fine. But it doesn’t mean that Michael Nicholson, who is, of course, dead now, but Michael Nicholson wasn’t a humanist. It was just that it wasn’t his style and it wasn’t at the center of his interest. He had the whole field of conflict research at his fingertips, but he was not in the conciliation business particularly.

Chris: Anybody else at all, do you think?

Tony DeReuck: There are a number of Quakers who – Kenneth Lee, for example. These people that are long gone.

Chris: Well, there was one you mentioned earlier on whom we both know, and who was there at the very beginning, and that was Cedric Smith.

Tony DeReuck: Oh yes, of course ! Well, Cedric Smith was a man who devoted himself – he was a great Quaker – he devoted himself to the interests of the Conflict Research Society. But he did what nearly all of us do if we’re not very careful. He occupied important roles like being president of the society after he had lost contact with the network and when he had exhausted his ideas. And I think that he very nearly sank the Society by not handing over to somebody younger and brighter and more up-to-date in time.

This is really no [criticism] of Cedric who was a marvelous man. He was a warm-hearted, gentle, and extremely clever man. His mathematics was – I understand – influential and original to a high degree. But the Society gradually fell into disrepute and became a club of about less than ten people. That, for a long period – something like five or ten years, and it could have flourished, and is now flourishing to some degree because it’s in younger hands.

Chris: I think probably we all have a tendency to hang on too long, don’t we?

Tony DeReuck: Yes, exactly.

Chris: Okay. From crucial people to... crucial ideas. What, for you, were interesting and central and crucial ideas that helped push this thing forward? You talked earlier on about some of the ideas to do with

negotiation. But what else? What else struck you at the time? And, of course, some of the ideas from anthropology.

Tony DeReuck: Well, may I add, I find it difficult to summon up anything intelligible to say about that? So let me say something rather oblique. It seems to me that in the early days, we were singularly fortunate in the problems that we tackled and the contacts that we made because at that time during the Cold War the conflicts which broke out and which we concerned ourselves with were decolonization...

It was the rapid and frequently onerous economic circumstances that equalization thrust up on the newly [independent] societies...

Chris: Yes. That's an interesting slant on that. I've never thought of that before. But I'm sure you're right

Tony DeReuck: May I just interrupt for a second? It occurs to me that we made an effort [to intervene] in Gibraltar... It didn't work, I thought, for three reasons. One was that we were Brits, and, therefore, [seen as partial] and not particularly trusted....

And the other reasons were that these Spaniards and the Gibraltarians both had been educated to a very high degree on what was "proper". And stepping outside the normal routines and listening to arguments that were not based on the stereotypes that they were used to - the balance of power principle, particularly - was unacceptable. And it didn't seem to me that we were ever going to get into that situation in the way that we had done elsewhere.

And the other thing was that total disparity of power between the Spaniards and the Gibraltarians - if the British backed off to the smallest degree, there's no doubt where the answer would lie. And that, I think, was also a complicating factor.

You see, one of the things which I suspected were in our favor in many cases and which John Burton didn't want to discuss, or at least he didn't want to discuss it in these terms, was the question of integration. I was inclined to think that the onset to all conflict is to investigate the possibility of integration of the parties to the conflict.

Conflict is a psychological situation in which the parties build barriers between themselves and break off all contact and dehumanize each other and don't think about relations with them. If, somehow, you can begin to build a relation between the relationships - a whole network of relationships between the

parties - you're beginning to approach the possibility of conciliation.

The take I would [adopt]... is to say that when the parties come to conceive of themselves as sharing a predicament, which both of them will be better off if they wriggle out of it, we will begin to build the possibility of cooperation, not with "the enemy", but some other soul who is in the same predicament as you are - a mirror image.

Now in most situations a disparity of power means that it is very difficult to paint the picture of a joint predicament. "They have the predicament but we're fireproof," is a strong deterrent to enter into any single, integrative discourse.

Chris: Yes. Do you know I'd actually forgotten that we undertook an initiative about the Gibraltar conflict !

Tony DeReuck: Did you really?

Chris: And we actually...almost brought together the two sides in a ...workshop when... one of the Indo-Pak wars broke out.

Tony DeReuck: Come to think of it, Margot Light, John Groom, and I, went to Teheran when the [Iranian Revolution] had taken place... And we attempted a sort of conciliation. I say attempted because the situation was extremely interesting and very peculiar.

It became apparent to me - I don't know how the others analyzed it - that the Ayatollah was a prisoner himself of the forces that he had unleashed. That these forces were mostly western-educated university students who were the main agents in imprisoning or taking hostage the American diplomats or American ambassadorial entourage.

And it was impossible for us to get at the principals, the **[inaudible]** by the Ayatollah himself and blamed his son who turned out to be an intermediary between the Ayatollah and the rest of the world. They took us to see the Ayatollah in a house which had been converted in a suburban part of Teheran, which had become his headquarters. It had been turned into a mosque. They did so by removing the floors between the ground floor and the upper story, but leaving the stairs there.

The women were permitted to go and view proceedings from what amounted to balconies in the upper floor. And we were conducted into one of the large rooms on the ground floor which were spread with... carpet.

The Ayatollah came in and we were told firstly that he was an old man. He was approaching 80 years of age. And that we were not to tire him so that we could, perhaps, spend a quarter of an hour talking to him through the intermediary of the Iranian foreign minister who had fluent English and French. He had been educated at the Sorbonne, if I remember rightly... I can't think of his name at the moment. A little while later, he was executed by the revolution...

Chris: They let Margot in as well?

Tony DeReuck: I believe not, no.

Chris: You and John?

Tony DeReuck: Certainly I was there... I don't remember who else came at that moment... But Margot was not, I think, admitted to the mosque. We were invited to sit cross-legged on the floor. The Ayatollah came in. His foreign minister sat beside him. The Ayatollah immediately embarked on what amounted to a political speech. I do not remember how long it lasted, but I suspect that it was 90 minutes non-stop ! Good grief. By the end of this time, to my astonishment, the foreign minister proceeded to translate the whole thing as though he'd rehearsed it and he spoke to us for perhaps half that time

By this time, I was rigid and my circulation had packed up and I could no longer unfold my legs. And they had said, "Don't delay the old man for more than a quarter of an hour," and we had now done something like two hours and you were quite prepared to bandy questions and answers. He was extraordinarily ! He talked about the development of Iranian economy.

He talked about the complete irrelevance of nuclear power to a place like that. The relevance of university [education] and the doctors, in particular, he said, "If we educate our doctors here, they all congregate in Teheran and won't go out to the villages. What I want is paramedics. Paramedics for the villages, from the outlying areas who will go back to their village and look after their own relatives. And I don't want major irrigation engineers and all this sort of thing."

And he talked a great deal of sense at great length. And he said, "The Americans are just gravel under my bare feet and just like a rock." And we got nowhere except in the insight into the situation he and the Ayatollahs found themselves in.

Chris: Did you get the opportunity to say, “Would you be interested in using us as a channel or setting up some problem-solving conversations?”

Tony DeReuck: Not exactly. We tried that sort of approach, but I was persuaded that it was not translated to him. My feeling was that what was conveyed to the Ayatollah was... “Oh, yes. They’re just making polite noises” - I think. I don’t know. I don’t speak Farsi. But that’s what appeared to be going on.

Chris: Well, that must have been – I’m trying to think dates now – the late ‘70s, early ‘80s?

Tony DeReuck: I think that [took place] in the late ‘70s or early ‘80s. And... we were given a beautiful Persian plate with... in the face of it was a little medallion which gave the dates of all this, which we’ve got somewhere upstairs in the study. I’m afraid I haven’t looked it up. I would think it was early ‘80s.

Chris: ... Well, that was something that I certainly wasn’t a part of, and I’m glad to know about it.

Let me ask you just to...take up this idea of “the field” - that we tried to be practical and applied, and your experience of it - and mine, to some degree - has been pushing the idea of “facilitated dialogues” and “problem-solving workshops”. My impression is that it’s gotten more and more difficult to do that sort of thing.

Tony DeReuck: Yes. This, I think, I would attribute - in part at least - to familiarity with the conflict-resolving community so that authorities have met it before and it comes than less than an innovatory surprise. I think the surprise of having people who had the – chutzpa is the word I was thinking about – the sheer cheek and the insolence to intrude. And I think also that the problems with which we now have to deal seem to me to be much less tractable, mostly because they don’t come from a centralized organization. This, of course, implies most emphatically to anything connected with what is now called terrorism. But it also applies [to Israel and] to the Palestinians, not just today, but forever.

I visited Palestine and Israel three times when we went to Lebanon and visited Egypt in the same spirit, and the difficulties, particularly with the Palestinians, was that they lacked a centralized organization – a major problem. Now, if you haven’t got a centralized organization to deal with, I think it opens up all

sorts of possibilities which can only be taken advantage of if you have a lot of time and resources.

I don't think it actually disables you. At least, it doesn't necessarily disable. But it does mean that it's an infinitely [complex] process, for in a way it almost requires that you should build somebody up until other people in their community think that their ideas are so startlingly new and useful that they should be listened to.

Chris: A long time period.

Tony DeReuck: Just so. And the resources required in the... communication team are then enormously increased and have never, I think, existed.

Chris: Yes - I think you're right. It is something that is difficult to run from a university, because of the university demands. It's difficult to run from an organization like John [Burton] was always talking about, the "Green Cross" Organization. But Green Cross Organizations are constantly looking for funds for support, and resources... So I'm not sure what the answer is, at the moment.

Tony DeReuck: One of them [might involve] the sort of [level of] organization that newspapers command, that the media command. Based upon this dispersal [it]...might work wonders. But to build up something like the media network that is required, both for intelligence and for contact and networking, is quite beyond the scope of [the kind of small] organization such as we have always been associated with.

Chris: Let me turn –

Tony DeReuck: Oh, by the way, you asked [about people]. Of course, I'm being perfectly parochial. People like Herb Kelman...Who was our favorite at Columbus, Ohio? People like that, are infinitely undervalued by me in this talk that we've had. They're the sort of people who were the salt of the earth and the blood, lifeblood of our movement, and I'm sorry I didn't instantly think of them.

Chris: ...Looking back on the development of what you just called "our movement" [was there] anything during that development which really surprised you? Is there anything that surprised you positively - that this was a good thing - or negatively that, "Gosh, we didn't understand that?" Was there anything which really startled you?

Tony DeReuck: Now you come to remind me, I do think of the “disectability” of the discipline, the way it has grown, and the extraordinary number organizations which have “muscle in” on the act. Some very curious names have been given to them. Like the dramaturgical movement.

Chris: I like to think of them as... the fringe of the movement.

Tony DeReuck: Well, I suppose they are. I must say, I attributed to them fringe status. But on the other hand, I also feel abashed because I’m quite sure that we were a fringe in the eyes of almost everybody, especially those who were paid through [grants] on behalf of anything from the Red Cross to the Foreign Office, all thought of us as grit in the machine.

Chris: Well, there’s nothing quite like people who previously been a fringe to... point to others as being ex-fringes of anyone.

Just a couple of final ones. Here we are now... what would you like to see happen in [the field for the future], if you were to be able to steer it in a particular way?

Tony DeReuck: Let me see – You and I, Christopher, were connected with the Foundation for International Conciliation. My perception of that was that it should be a sort of a center for the analysis of conflict such as John Burton ran ... properly funded and located...

It was financed in 1984 by a television cable tycoon called Michael Davis, you’ll recall, and it was patronized – the principle trustees were members of the Swiss government. And the people concerned from our side were extremely august. The Archbishop of York, John Hapgood at the time, and Jean Freymond, joined you and me as consultants. And the idea was to – my idea and I think our idea generally, was [to set up] the analysis of conflict on a permanent and official basis.

It flourished for - I think - less than a decade during which time it [undertook] a lot of very good work, but not along the lines that you and I had actually laid down for it. Michael Davis was a man who not only supplied the monetary backing, but he also supplied the organizational grit. And he was a man who was very used to doing things on a large scale, very quickly, and wasn’t really psychologically adapted to cooperating with other gentle Franciscan souls like us. He was a Dominican

Chris: Maybe a Jesuit !

Tony DeReuck:

Well, yes. I think actually that's more likely. Anyway, he took the thing to South Africa. Instead of asking the South Africans, which we would have done, "How do you think you can get out of this situation?" he called meetings and put to them various drafts of the South African Constitution and discussed with them, "Which of these would you prefer?"

He then, having decided that this wasn't reaching – that he was not reaching a consensus with the South Africans of all shapes and sizes, he moved over to Cambodia. And he rightly decided that the country was completely destroyed. Its infrastructure was totally destroyed.

And he then did something which was natural to his expertise, and that was to say that if the communication system within the country were properly restored, if all elements in the country could communicate with all other elements, then the situation would be improved and the people might then reestablish themselves as a nationwide community and might select their own leaders and all that sort of thing.

Well, this was a very worthy idea. It's the sort of thing that a media man would immediately fasten onto. And he began to revive the media and particularly the broadcasting media in Cambodia as the first step towards reuniting the country. Now this is a very sensible thing to do, I'm sure, but it had got nothing to do with what we thought we were capable of helping him with.

Anyway, having attempted this, with what success I don't know. For all I know, it was extremely successful. For all I know, it collapsed from that infrastructure of funds and so on. It was never reported. But Michael Davis ran out of energy and funds and foreclosed on the whole enterprises.

Instead of handing it over, as I had prayed that he would, to the Swiss or to anybody else, he simply announced the dissolution of the Foundation for International Conciliation. And the trustees [unfortunately] allowed this to happen. I think it was a great shame. It was a very well-founded idea. I would like something like that to be attempted again.

Chris:

Well, it may come about. One of the things that Herb Kelman has been talking about for a long time - which he says he is very keen to start up again – is... John Burton's old idea of a Green Cross and he would like to do that. I don't know what sort of success Herb is having. But I think all of us would like some kind of an organization like that to be in existence.

Let me ask you the two final questions we ask everybody. The first question is something you've already partly answered indirectly, but I'll ask the question directly. If you were [conducting this study] who would you recommend that we pursue as an essential founder of the field...who is still around? We have talked with Herb [Kelman], we have talked with Chad [Alger]. We have talked with David Singer Who else?

Tony DeReuck: I do think that it's possible that you might find Margot Light a useful member of your community. She was a specialist in Russian affairs and was actually in or in the vicinity of Chernobyl when the [accident] occurred. No, I think actually she was due to go up there and went out early –

Chris: To bring the students back, I think.

Tony DeReuck: To bring the students back, yes. Because our students, hers and mine, were out in Russia at the time. The list of people you have interrogated so far is so wide and deep that I'm somewhat at a loss to think of anybody you've omitted. But I do think that Margot –

Chris: Would be worth talking to.

Tony DeReuck: – would be worth talking to. And I think she might have a slightly different angle on almost everything. You know that – did you ever go to the Russian [Centre for the Study of the USA] with us?

Chris: No. I think I missed that. They came here, didn't they?

Tony DeReuck: Yes, they did. They did. Well, John and Margot, who speaks Russian, and Michael Banks...

Chris: So - last question. If you were sitting here interviewing Tony DeReuck, what question would you have asked Tony that I haven't asked? What have I left out?

Tony DeReuck: I used to have to interview potential members of staff of my university and I always asked them as a last question, "What questions would you wished that I'd asked you?"

Chris: Well, there you are. Now the tables are turned.

Tony DeReuck: Well, I really don't know what question I would – mind you, tomorrow, I shall write to you and tell you what the question should have been.

Chris: ...Tony, looking back again – looking back over the last 50-odd years, what do you think we've achieved in that time? What advances have we made? How have we improved things?

Tony DeReuck: I do believe that we have had much more success than we imagined that we have had. On the other hand, I think that it is very difficult to know what success you have had in this field if you don't know what would have happened if you hadn't intervened. This is a common difficulty.

You, yourself, said, Chris, earlier in conversation off camera that this is something that every diplomat experiences, of course. He doesn't know what would have happened if the argument had gone differently or if there had never been an argument at all. But my own feeling is that the point of which has been inserted and I think actually that the wedge may have been driven in a little deeper than people imagined. It seems to me that the vocabulary which we use is now [generally accepted and used.]

One talks about “peace processes” in Ireland and in Palestine. It seems to me that... there are whole processes and whole vocabularies and ways of looking at things which are regularly deployed now, are reflections of the field to which our endeavors [were directed] that have come subliminally[come into] the record. The Oslo report in Israeli/Palestine relations was a tribute I think in part at least - to the peace movement. The fact that it was held in Oslo alone is a significant straw in the wind.

On the other hand, it is true that lip service rather than actual action or observance of the [ideas] – I'm not discouraged by this. It does seem to me that [the] unit of time in learning new tricks in any branch of anything - from nuclear physics to diplomatic practice - is a generation. And I don't expect anybody in [the diplomatic game] to change its practice.

It's very difficult to get people to actually learn “on the hoof”. But... I think that the seeds sewn among our students... will act to leaven the lump in due course. It does seem to me that certain vocabularies in circulation to a quite remarkable degree.

Chris: Okay... talking about vocabulary and going back to the very beginning of that period, when you actually... became involved with Jack Monger and John and all the rest of the group, what was it you thought you were getting into? I mean, when you talk of

peace research and peace making, conflict resolution or the Conflict Research Society, was there a field that you thought you were getting into? What did you think you were becoming? Having been a respectable physicist, what was this new thing you were getting into?

Tony DeReuck:

Well, it seemed to me that there was a field and the minute particulars in which one could practice. The field was an attempt to understand conflictual behavior between large groups as opposed to individual people which was in need of investigation on their own.

John Burton was by training a psychologist, and in the end, John always went back to the individual. His talk about needs towards the end of his [career] – or toward the more recent publications of his... He was, it seems to me, quite opposed to talking about values as opposed to needs, which were culturally induced collective [phenomena].. These were somehow or other inherent in individuals. And I thought, candidly, that this was a mistake.

It seemed to me that what we needed to talk about was group phenomenon. [Social conflict] would be best understood sociologically and anthropologically by social scientists. And the need in the end was to teach all Frenchmen to love Germans and all Germans to love Frenchmen, and that this was...beginning [to take place] before our very noses and showed what could be done in *extremis*.

That was what the Conflict Research Society, in one sense, was about. Now, to my mind, a fairly small offshoot of this was the question of actually getting leadership to learn and then to disperse or to distribute this advice its followers of how it could extricate itself from an unwelcome predicament. And that was what the conflict resolution aspect of the whole business of conflict research [was about]. It seemed to be a very small aspect.

And as time went on, it peaked greatly at being [professional] peacemakers. I was quite keen on being [the] best, but...

Chris:

With what did you wish to be best?

Tony DeReuck:

But it didn't seem to me that the urgent thing was to have people who actually contrived a local truce. Now John would [not] agree with that totally. But the real problem was the diffusion of integrative feelings among large sections of the population. And we talked about achieving some degree of agreement among the

elite, who then returned to their own societies and were burned up by the skeptical reentry into their own environment.

It seemed to me that that was the major problem that the conflict research community had to look at.

Chris: Where did “peace” come into this? Was it different from conflict?

Tony DeReuck: Well, we have hinted at this before. I do think that we were certainly seen – and I didn’t mind, personally, but other people felt uncomfortable... but what I did mind was being regarded as very radical and being possibly mistaken for a communist. The word “peace” had the wrong flavor, and for the majority of the population who regarded it as a propaganda word...
... Peace became an acceptable aim, although - rather – “peace” became an acceptable word – imperceptibly - as “communism” ceased to be a mythical dragon to be opposed. The total collapse of the socialist ideal still astonishes me and I doubt very much whether history in the long run will show that this was the victory of democracy over [communism as it’s being] interpreted at the moment.

I do think strange things - such as, for example, that if the first communist states had been Scandinavian states, they would have handled it totally differently and we should all now want a spot of the [results]. If socialism in the Soviet sense had awaited the invention and perfection of the computer culture [which has not yet been fully attained by long shot], they might have found, for example, that steering the economy in profitable directions – that’s the wrong word – in “fruitful” directions was possible.

I’m not at all clear that the directed economy has failed. I think it was prematurely attempted. I also think that it raises some dreadful problems that have not been solved which democracy is now repeating. We have created in Europe a larger agglomeration of people which can possibly operate a multi-cultural democracy. This is the anxiety that Johan Galtung has been expressing for some time. And I don’t know how it’s going to be accommodated.

Chris: Yes - it’s growing and growing.

Tony DeReuck: I’m not sure how peace has been accepted. But it seems to me [that this is associated] with the decrease of the role of communism as the enemy.

Chris: In the early days of peace... [research], when Jack and Cedric came to you, what did you think you were getting into? What did

you think you were entering? A new field? A new discipline? An interesting hobby? What was it you were entering in those early days?

Tony DeReuck: I hoped very much that we were about to create a new field. This is not a tremendously ambitious thing. Very recently... in the '60s, the field of biochemistry had arisen. Chemists and biologists had joined hands and the physicists had intervened and DNA had been unraveled.

The spiral helix and all that sort of stuff had created a new discipline of biochemistry which was suddenly cropping up in all the universities. Everybody was pouring money into it. And the mechanism of creating a new discipline, of bringing people together and forming a new society had been created. All these things were going hand in hand [with] a new profession. And I thought we were creating a new profession...

... I remember particularly in the days when we were teaching, attending a meeting of the International Political Science Association... some women were present in numbers, young girls, - students mostly I imagine, though some of them were a bit older. And I said something like this - that in the 1930s, to be born an Englishman was to have won the lottery of life, the winning ticket in the lottery of life.

To be male and British at a time when Britain was the hegemonial power, and to be male was a very - and they rose up and they said, "Bloody antifeminist. You rotten sod !." And what I meant was, "I'm sorry about all that." But they wouldn't listen to that bit, of course.

Chris: I know you've been... in other fields recently, but are you thinking of writing anything at all? Are you thinking of looking back and writing something for *International Affairs* ? What are you thinking of doing?

Tony DeReuck: That was a question that you've not yet asked. The answer is that I feel that I have lost contact with the literature. And I'm not really in the mainstream any longer, intellectually. I must say that I have repeatedly, wryly, thought that somewhere deep inside me there is a book which I ought to have written and the notes for it, as it were, fill a crate which is on the floor over there. But I shall never write it. And I don't think that this is any great loss. It's a loss to me, but not to anyone else !