"No more Somalias" has become shorthand for the perils of humanitarian intervention. Like earlier slogans-"no more Munichs," "no more Vietnams"-the catchphrase implies a set of lessons learned and perceived implications for future policy initiatives. The conventional wisdom is that U.S. intervention in Somalia failed because "mission creep" led U.S. forces to adopt a "nation-building" mandate, thereby ming the operation in local political disputes. The policy implications are clear: Washington should avoid intervention whenever possible and restrict involvement to shortterm, nonpolitical humanitarian initiatives when public pressures demand some kind of action.
But the conventional wisdom is wrong. It reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of the lessons of Somalia and risks denying U.S. policymakers opportunities to address the underlying political causes of humanitarian emergencies. The Somalia operation failed because it lacked a coordinated strategy to initiate the reconstruction of political institutions necessary for a sustainable solution. The error was not that the operation was too ambitious and became diverted from its humanitarian mandate but that it was insufficiently political from the start.
The fear of becoming involved in politics has led Washington to insist on mandates limited to humanitarian goals. But there is no such thing as a purely humanitarian military intervention. The presence of thousands of foreign troops inherently will transform the relative balance of forces on the ground and alter local actors' behavior. The misplaced fear of nation-building has led U.S. leaders to place blinders on their understanding of humanitarian crises and the role military intervention can play. Rather than banning discussion of the political consequences of intervention, a strategy that links military, diplomatic, and humanitarian actions must be one of the first questions considered.
The necessity of linking a political strategy to a humanitarian intervention is illustrated by the current crisis in eastern Zaire. International humanitarian actions in 1994 played a critical part in allowing Hutu extremists to take control of huge camps in Zaire along the Rwandan border. These camps, filled with refugees intimidated into staying as a human shield to protect the Hutu perpetrators of the 1994 genocide, threatened regional security. The failure to address the underlying political causes of the 1994 crisis led directly to the humanitarian crisis of 1996.
Even if scaled back, a plan to introduce foreign troops into central Africa will change the balance of power among parties in three countries-Zaire, Rwanda, and Burundi-with important implications for Uganda and Tanzania. A decision to use the intervention to protect relief corridors and assist repatriation will have very different long-term political consequences from one designed to establish safe havens for Hutus in Zaire. Insurgent Banyamulenge (Zairian Tutsis) will try to use the intervention to win international recognition for their zone of control in eastern Zaire while the government in Kinshasa will insist that the intervention respect the state's sovereignty.
The recent return of a large number of refugees may permit the United States to avoid military intervention in eastern Zaire. But the need for a coherent strategy and active engagement by the United States and its allies will remain. The political transition in Zaire, as its longtime leader Mobutu Sese Seko remains ill in France while a timetable for elections develops, requires particularly delicate but forceful attention. The Banyamulenge need to be assured their citizenship rights in Zaire. In Rwanda, the international community must help resettle the refugees and carefully monitor conditions within Rwanda. Support for the UN War Crimes Tribunal for the perpetrators of the 1994 genocide must be made effective, and generous assistance to the Rwandan government to rebuild its judicial institutions is necessary. In Burundi, regional efforts led by former Tanzanian president Julius Nyerere to pressure the military government to return to democracy and power sharing deserve our support.
These tasks may not require military intervention today, but more U.S. attention now may well prevent another humanitarian crisis and another difficult debate over the deployment of U.S. troops later. President Clinton's insistence that "the world's most powerful nation must not turn its back on so many desperate people and so many innocent children" continues to apply even after the immediate emergency has abated. The current crisis offers us another chance to learn the real lessons of Somalia and accept the necessity of sustained engagement guided by a political strategy.