The field of conflict resolution is divided on whether traditional nation-state negotiations and resulting treaties such as the Dayton Peace Agreement are, in fact, “conflict resolution” in practice. Negotiation as a competitive process supports zero-sum outcomes through a competitive process, and can institutionalize structural violence within societies. In the case of Bosnia, economic disparity, discrimination, and social injustice are also the legacy of Dayton. Informing the negotiations at Dayton was the intelligence produced by the CIA’s Balkan Task Force (BTF). I will argue that the type of analysis needed to support collaborative peace process is different from conventional intelligence. The threat orientation of traditional intelligence makes it better suited to waging war than peace. The obstacles to intelligence support of positive peacemaking in Bosnia were several and at least in part a product of intelligence institutions, tradecraft, and a highly stylized genre of writing with formal and informal discursive limits. This discourse privileges divisions over commonalities, positions over interests, and threats over opportunities. The realist perspective of the BTF intelligence reified identity groups into “us” and “them”, precluding possibilities beyond ethnic divides. This paper addresses the limitations of traditional intelligence which grows out of an imperative to warn as an adequate foundation for peace process, which must both arise from, as well as foster, optimism.