Third Party Mediations and Missed Opportunities in Nagorno Karabakh: A Design for a Possible Solution

The Karabakh conflict is the longest and arguably the bloodiest conflict within the newly independent states (NIS) of the former Soviet Union. There have been six distinct and unsuccessful major mediation efforts between September 1991-June 1996 to assist the conflicting parties to sign a formal ceasefire and to begin formal negotiations to solve their differences: 1. Boris Yeltsin and Nursultan Nazarbayev, September 1991; 2. Iranian government, February 1992; 3. CSCE March 1992; 4. Nazarbayev, August 1992; 5. Russia, November 1993 and, 6. Co-chairs December 199 4-  present .

From April 1993-February 1994, the most intensive warfare of the conflict took place in which more than 10,000 soldiers on both sides were killed, one-million refugees were created, and the economies of the antagonists were devastated. In May 1994, the adversaries signed an unofficial ceasefire that has lasted to date (July 1996). The leaders of the core parties have publicly foresworn violence for negotiations.

This research examines the reasons why the mediations did not succeed and what the impetus was for the two-yearold unofficial ceasefire. These two questions are pursued by analyzing the concepts of: (1) conflicting party ripeness, (2) intervenor paradigm compatability with core party needs, (3) motivations for third party intervention, and (4) alternate paradigms that may have met the needs of the antagonists.

The findings indicate that numerous factors militated against mediator success and that traditional diplomacy alone may be unable to settle Karabakh-type conflicts:

1. The parties were not ripe until May 1994 after they had reached a hurting stalemate and internal political strife was neutralized.
2. The mediators had pursued their own agendas as the main priorities.
3. The paradigms employed by the mediators may have been counter-productive to the achievement of peace.
4. Third-party competition undermined the peace process.
5. The CSCE was probably not prepared in 1992 to assume the role of mediator.
6.  An eclectic paradigm integrating NGO conflict resolution experts as compliments to official diplomacy may help to resolve ethnic conflicts similar to Karabakh.