Abrogation and Misuse: Privatization of Military Force and Militarization of Aid in the Modern State

Legitimate use of force is one of the defining characteristics of a nation-state, but the United States seem determined to flip this legitimacy on its head and abrogate authority over some military matter while asserting military authority outside of the traditional military realm. Private security companies are paid far more than U.S. soldiers to fight in far corners of the world. Meanwhile, the Department of Defense continues to abrogate the functions of USAID and NGOs in the disbursement of humanitarian and development aid. In the U.S., soldiers and veterans are joining militias to protect the people from the government. Everyone seems to be staking a claim on the legitimate use of force and authority. It is enough to make the traditional theorists spin in their graves.

A large percentage of the personnel on the ground in Iraq and Afghanistan are contractors, rather than military or civilian employees. This is problematic in the first place because it indicates an inability or unwillingness on the part of the military to competently fight its own wars. Though I always hope we won’t invade another country, I know our government is likely to get entangled in foreign wars, and I want out next invasion to consist of U.S. soldiers, paid by, and thus accountable to, the people The US government has declared that in Iraq, contractors are not accountable to Iraqi law. Nor do they seem to be accountable to U.S. law. In December, a federal judge dismissed charges against five Blackwater guards charged with unlawful killing of civilians. The only one for whom charges were not dropped was the one who had already plead guilty. It seems rather suspect that this gentleman considered himself guilty murder while his colleagues were not culpable. It remains to be seen whether contractors will be held accountable to international law. Considering the conviction rates and speeds of international courts post-Nuremberg, most contractors won’t live long enough to find out, having died peacefully of old age before indictments are issued and judgments passed.

There is one arena where the state is managing to retain control though: the disbursement of humanitarian and development aid. This is also the task the military is the least qualified to handle. Aid recipients are often against the increased use of military disbursement of humanitarian aid, as are the NGOs who were traditionally charged with the task. Why then do we continue to shift disbursement of the foreign aid budget and supplies to military agencies? The case of aid work in Afghanistan illustrates strikingly why militaries should not be the primary providers of humanitarian aid and why aid organization should not be asked to engage in the work traditionally done by the military.

In January of 2010, eight international and Afghan aid organizations – Oxfam International, Afghanaid, CARE Afghanistan, Act on Aid, Christian Aid, Concern Worldwide, and TroCaire – released a report and suggestions on militarization of aid in Afghanistan. The Oxfam report argues that aid provided or directed by military organizations is too often focused on a quick fix that does little to serve the population in the long term. International aid organizations have been on the ground in Afghanistan for many years, far longer than the current military operations have been in existence. These aid organizations are committed to remaining in the country well beyond the current war. It is these organizations, not the governments and militaries waging war in the country, that should be responsible for the primary disbursement and implementation of aid in Afghanistan. An April 2008 Congressional report on aid in Afghanistan found that “the lack of planning led PRTs to pursue short-term, feel good projects (with success measured by money spent or satisfaction of the local governor) without consideration of larger strategic and capacity-building implications” (U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Armed Services). Focusing on infrastructure such as school buildings, while ignoring needs such as trained and qualified teachers, school supplies, and safe and reliable transportation for students does not help Afghanistan’s civilian population. The military model is also not sustainable unless the military presence in Afghanistan is sustained, something the American and Afghan people have indicated they do not want. Aid should be provided by the aid organizations that will be in the country long after foreign militaries pull out.

The problem is not just that governments and militaries are taking over the jobs traditionally done by aid organizations. Donor governments increasingly demand that aid agencies in conflict zones and potential conflict zones engage in counterinsurgency work – a clear violation of humanitarian space. The United States has also defined aid in Afghanistan as a “non-lethal weapon” to be used to “win the hearts and minds of the indigenous population to facilitate defeating the insurgents” (U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, 2009). This totally contravenes the idea of “humanitarian space” and has a great potential to damage the future of any aid operations in the country; those implemented directly by militaries and those of aid agencies. Once the local people associate aid with the U.S. Army, they will forever associate it with the Army. There is an understandable lack of trust from some Afghans toward U.S. personnel — in addition to the fact that we’ve bombed their country, contractors and troops have been accused of crimes, both garden variety and of war. It will be difficult for Oxfam or CARE to convince people that the aid they are providing is truly humanitarian aid, an not tied to a political project. For example, CARE has found that government supported schools are more often targeted for attack than those built by NGOs in partnership with local communities (http://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/quick-impact-quick-collap...). If aid and the military continue to be tied together in Afghanistan, it is unlikely that militants will continue to separate between governments and aid providers. No one organization or agency can do all things. The military is simply not best suited for providing humanitarian aid, and the idea that it does provide aid contravenes much of the notion of humanitarian aid. Greater coordination between aid organizations, governmental agencies, and local partners is desirable, but organizations should be allowed to do what they do best, rather than attempt to provide services that they are not well suited for or which compromise their central mission, whether they be militaries or aid organizations.

Of course, governments have used mercenaries as long as wars have been fought and governments and individuals have long pursued wrong-headed methods of “helping” those less fortunate. So, is any of this really new or more threatening than what came before it? Maybe not. However, when viewed in the context of the ways other state structures are being weakened around the world — for example, complete state failure in Somalia and the growth of corporate control globally — it is an interesting and alarming trend. The modern state is a fairly new development, historically, and is bound to decline eventually. The question is not if, but when and what will it be replaced with. Private companies and armies seem to be one possibility. Perhaps the US could benefit from some the nation-building and democracy we are intent on foisting off on other nations, if we want to retain the government’s legitimate control over the country.

Works Cited:

US Army Combined Arms Center, Commanders Guide to Money as a Weapons System: Tactics, techniques and Procedures, April 2009.

US House of Representatives Committee on Armed Services, Sub-Committee on Oversight and Investigations, Agency Stovepipes versus Strategic Agility, April 2008.

Oxfam International, Quick Impact, Quick Collapse: The Dangers of Militarized Aid in Afghanistan, January 2010. Retrieved from http://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/quick-impact-quick-collap..., March 16, 2010.