Global Ambitions: A Critical Reading of the Report on “Graduate Education and Professional Practice in International Peace and Conflict”

In August of 2010, the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) released a special report titled, “Graduate Education and Professional Practice in International Peace and Conflict.” The report details findings from a study conducted to measure the level of academic preparedness of graduate students and professionals looking to establish careers within the field of international conflict. The results of the study do not bode well for graduate students or their academic institutions. In fact, Carstarphen, Zelizer, Harris, and Smith (2010) state, “Graduate-level academic institutions are not adequately preparing students for careers in international peace and conflict management” (p. 1). And this is just the first sentence of the summary.

Carstarphen et al. (2010) indicate that the Alliance for Conflict Transformation (ACT) was commissioned in 2005 by USIP to conduct an assessment of the preparedness of graduate students for work international conflict. The authors write, the “goal of this study was to explore the match between academic program offerings and the needs of the organizations and agencies that hire individuals for international conflict work” (2010, p. 2). From its title, the report appears to position itself as an overarching examination of graduate education and professional practice. In reality, the thrust of the report is decidedly one-way, emphasizing the relationship of graduate programs as the producers of skilled labor for organizations working in international conflict. According to Carstarphen et al., roughly half of the employing organizations interviewed felt students were unprepared upon graduation to work in these settings and that there was substantial room for improvement in graduate education. In short, academic programs are not providing students with the skills and knowledge employing organizations deem necessary for employment post-graduation.

One could read the summary and conclude based on its findings that graduate education in international peace and conflict is in a state of poor affairs. After all, in skimming the first page, the authors are quite forceful in their argument that the needs of employer organizations are not being met by graduate education. However, within the body of the report, the question of graduate education and preparedness unveils itself as a far more complicated issue than initially portrayed. Carstarphen et al. (2010) indicate that while slightly more than 50% of employers feel that graduate students are unprepared, roughly 90% of students and faculty feel the opposite. Therefore, the proclamation that graduate programs are failing to sufficiently prepare students is contested ground between the perceptions of employers and the perceptions of students, alumni, and faculty. In positing their conclusion as a lack of appropriate practical knowledge and applied skills, Carstarphen et al. conclude that employer perceptions of graduates is a truthful measure of the current situation. After a careful review of their report, I am unsure about the accuracy of their claims and am skeptical their recommendations will benefit students of international peace and conflict.

If we take the report at face value, we can read it as a condemnation of the priorities of graduate education for emphasizing theory over practice. In spite of this initial reading, the contradiction in perception between academic programs (faculty, students, and alumni) and employer organizations points to a severe disagreement over the meaning of preparedness. While the report positions itself as an authoritative voice demanding action on behalf employers, a close reading of the text casts doubts on the validity of its authority. Specifically, the methodological considerations used to conduct the research are weak and lacking in transparency for such a damning critique. In a field as diverse as international peace and conflict, taking the big tent approach of inclusion makes it all the more important that the object under study be clearly defined and at the very least, reasonably comparable. The porous borders of international conflict make this a Herculean task. When demarcating the field, it becomes essential to recognize the differences in mission and scope of the organizations and institutions involved. The surface level analysis provided by Carstarphen et al. (2010) of the relationship between employer needs and academic programs fails to take seriously differences in approaches and philosophies toward working in international conflict revealed by the report. Additionally, it begs us to ask why a more reflexive and inclusive approach was not taken before determining the needs of employer organizations as superior. In defining the task as one of matching academic programs with hiring organizations, the authors failed to engage in the critical task demanded by the field of constant self-reflection, a crucial step required for the our continued growth and development.

What follows is an attempt to offer a critical reading of the report on “Graduate Education and Professional Practice in International Peace and Conflict.” I will begin by situating the project within the frame of critical inquiry demanded by contemporary conflict theory. Next, I will explore the methodological considerations used to conduct the study. Focusing on these considerations allows us to measure the weight of the claims being made. I will proceed by interrogating the results of the report and the authors’ conclusions as drawn from their data as it relates to the state of graduate education. Finally, I will present an alternate interpretation of the report based on the previous discoveries and as situated within the context of discourses on global capitalism.

Prelude to Dissection

The proper consequence of graduate education is a healthy skepticism for all information. This skepticism springs not from a negative desire, but out of a commitment to the concept that critical interrogation is necessary developing knowledge. A critical reading then demands a certain engagement with the text that moves beyond initial observations to ask more probing questions. In this case, what rapidly becomes apparent is the positioning of the report; it demands action while simultaneously revealing little of its origins. A primary consideration must be based on the strength of the authors claim for change. Who funded the report and why? Who are the organizations demanding change and how is their demand being measured? It is apparent when we read through the report that we are unsure which employer organizations support changes and which organizations do not. Additionally, we must consider the impact of the desired changes on the subjects they are placed. Graduate students are referenced throughout as malleable objects in the hands of academic institutions. Is this an accurate representation? Is the transition from a focus on general conflict education to specialization a desired evolution in the development of the field of international conflict work? Dare we ask what graduate students think of the worth of such changes? While there are scores of supplementary questions that can and should be asked of the report, we should also not limit our speculation to just the field. We should consider how such transformations relate to trends in other academic programs and beyond. The demand for labor specialization is not unique to international conflict and if anything reflects the changing face of labor under global capitalism. The movement from industrial manpower to biopower (knowledge/service labor) is indicative of a larger shift in the relations of production in advanced capitalist societies (see Hardt and Negri, 2000; Harvey, 2004). Capital increasingly demands specialized forms of labor and the use of administrators to manage and negate occurrences of conflict. The emergence of a international peace and conflict economy with close ties to the advocates of the neoliberal world order (World Bank and IMF) requires us to approach all claims for efficiency and practical skill over critical thought with a healthy degree of skepticism.

A Question of Terms – Defining the Subject Under Study

It should be noted from the beginning that Carstarphen et al. set themselves up with an incredibly difficult task in trying to define, let alone determine, the boundaries of the field of international peace and conflict. The authors begin by acknowledging the collapse of boundaries between what are assumed as two initially distinct areas of work related to conflict: those who work in international conflicts and those who work on international conflicts. Those who work in conflicts are involved projects dealing with humanitarian aid, development, and governance. Those who work on conflict focus on prevention, mitigation, management and resolution (peace agreements, diplomacy, etc…). Carstarphen et al. (2010) claim the boundaries between these two areas are disappearing due to overlap in interests and practices. Those working in conflicts desire to bring conflict sensitivity to their work, while those working on conflicts are increasingly concerned with root causes such as poverty. There is no discussion as to the prior relationship between those who work in and those who work on, nor is any mention made of tensions caused by the blurring of lines between these related but disparate groups. However, as a result increased demand, the number of graduate programs designed to prepare people for work in and on international conflict has also increased. There are both programs focused solely on international conflict and programs in development, security studies, and the like that now offer an integrated course of study focused on international conflict.

Carstarphen et al. (2010) offer a broad view of employing organizations working in and on international conflict and types of academic programs offering graduate education focused on international conflict. The term (international conflict), however, is itself left undefined. The absence of a specific definition of the phenomenon indicates a nebulous global scope for the possible circumstances and types of activities employing organizations might find themselves involved in. Under this banner falls a range of possible international conflict opportunities including, working on post-conflict stabilization and democracy building in Iraq, gender mainstreaming in the DRC, involvement with the UN peacekeeping mission in Cyprus, supporting indigenous rights in Colombia, or as part of a provisional reconstruction team in Afghanistan. All of these activities would be considered under the heading of work in or on international conflict and demonstrate the range of locations, conflict types (no war, civil war, interstate war), and possible organizations doing the work (individuals to IGOs to NGOs) based both internationally and in the United States.

The range in academic programs offering international conflict training and education is also quite broad. It is certainly not limited to the United States, but a global enterprise. There are significant qualitative distinctions between academic programs focused on conflict resolution, peace education, security studies, development and human rights; these distinctions are by no means fluid. Within the specific realm of peace and conflict studies, the distinction in terms used highlights different philosophies toward the study of conflict, be it peace studies (Galtung), conflict resolution (Burton), or conflict management (USIP). Differences in theory can lead to profound differences in the implementation of practice. Carstarphen et al. acknowledge this spread of diversity within academic programs and employing organizations, yet fail to provide more than a cursory explanation of how this diversity influences perceptions within their study.

The Study

Sixty interviews were conducted in total with faculty (25), students (14), and employers (21) who comprised the broadly defined field of international conflict in 2005. The sampling process for participants is not discussed in any detail. Sixty-one students and alumni were surveyed during this time, but only 14 were contacted for a follow-up interview. We are unsure how the 14 were selected. There is no mention of how the interviews were structured, the type of questions asked, or how the data were analyzed. Thirteen academic programs are represented from nine postgraduate institutions; the authors consider all as primarily focused on international conflict. The program names and institutions are unlisted. Twenty possible employing organizations are represented, including: “U.S. government agencies, intergovernmental agencies, and U.S.-based nonprofit and for-profit entities in the fields of conflict resolution, humanitarian operations, development, and consulting that work worldwide” (Carstarphen et al., 2010, p. 12). By this description, I am assuming that all employers and academic programs are based in the United States with no foreign-based organizations represented in the study. It is also unclear as to whether this study was comprehensive of academic programs and organizations scattered throughout the United States or whether the study concentrated on those strictly located within the Washington, DC area.

At its most specific, the report is centered on the perceptions of an undefined selection of primarily U.S. based employing organizations generally concentrated on “humanitarian and operational work” (Carstarphen et al., 2010, p. 3). It is unclear as to the scope of activities covered by these organizations and at what level they operate within conflict zones. Furthermore, there is no quantifying information about the type (U.S. government agency, NGO, IGO, etc…) or sector (development, peacebuilding, rule of law, etc…) represented by employing organizations. We are also unable to determine by the information provided if the category graduate students (both included in the study as participants and reflected as the objects of the study) is indicative of U.S. and/or foreign students, or for that matter whether the students in question attended U.S. and/or foreign academic institutions. This lack of specificity and clarity is problematic given the hundreds of organizations and thousands of individuals doing international conflict work throughout the world.

As consequence, we must be skeptical of the one piece of statistical data given by Carstarphen et al. (2010) to justify their introductory statement that graduate students are inadequately prepared to work in international conflict. In total, this study is based on contact with 107 individuals. Eighty-six of those people were students, alumni or faculty, and their voices are largely absent from the summary results presented on the first page. This leaves 21 professionals as the foundation from which the report draws its conclusion. Of these 21 professionals from 20 organizations, we are presented with Figure 1 indicating a dissatisfaction rate of just over 50% (Carstarphen et al., 2010, p. 7). Of the 21individuals interviewed, 11 from what are the hundreds of organizations operating in conflict zones throughout the world, considered graduate education in international conflict to need substantial improvement. The problem with using such an assertive statistic as conclusive evidence and starting a publication with such a bold proclamation about inadequacy in a field as diverse as Carstarphen et al. claim it to be, is that the voices of 11 let alone 21 people hardly carry much statistical significance given a possible population of thousands. Can one person evaluate the conflict preparedness of individuals working with USAID, USIP, or any of the large NGOs on their vastly different projects throughout the world? Without more detailed information we are unable to determine if the recommendations that follow come from a spread of NGOs and governmental organizations or if they are only representative of 11 dissatisfied voices in the same sector. As a result of what appears as the U.S.-centric focus of the report, it is silent in terms of providing the opinions of strictly international organizations and more importantly, any input from the communities these graduates actually worked in (Iraq, Afghanistan, Kosovo, etc…). The conspicuous absence of specifics and the limitation in scope of the research does not provide a solid foundation from which to launch such an unflattering critique of graduate education. While these considerations are extremely important for accessing the power behind the authors’ critique, it should not stop us from taking into account the conclusions and recommendations they put forth.

The Findings

The methodological limitations of the study cast doubt about the accuracy of the overall project, but we should not dismiss the findings outright. Indeed, most would agree that finding ways to improve graduate education is a worthwhile pursuit. What we need then is to consider the results and recommendations within the context of U.S. based international conflict programs and employer organizations, and what effect changes in graduate education might have on the overall field.

Carstarphen et al. (2010) produce a chart comparing the top five KSAs (knowledge, skills, and abilities) valued by academic programs and employers (p. 4). It is of little surprise that academic programs value theories of conflict analysis and resolution among the top two. These are followed by regional and political knowledge, concluding with applied skills. On the flip side, employers value field work or internships abroad in the top slot, followed by program management skills, country specific multi-cultural or language skills, conflict analysis and resolution knowledge, and closing out with sector-specific, practical and/or technical expertise. These two lists share some items in common, but are radically different in their arrangement of priorities.

Drawing from this list, Carstarphen et al. (2010) explain how the structure of academic programs hampers students from obtaining more specialized, applied skills desired by employers. Course progression moves from basic to specialized, but elective options are generally the only chance for students to become a subject experts. Specialization with applied skills is not a core component of most programs, with emphasis being placed on theory. Employer demands for specialists are based in part on the idea that these students will bring direct benefit to teams working in the field. The interviews indicate academic programs are producing generalists, which in turn, are considered of little value if the individual does not possess specific regional/political knowledge beyond the basic set.

The top KSA of employers is international experience. Why exactly international experience matters so much is not clearly explained, but we can infer that exposure to different cultures has some intrinsic value. Carstarphen et al. (2010) are sympathetic noting that it is difficult for students to gain this valued experience. Lack of resources and an absence of partner organizations make it far more likely that students who desire field experience will have to obtain it domestically. While there is little question that programs should encourage students to gain field experience, what tangible skills or knowledge this translates into for working in an international setting – in terms of benefits to both the student and the employer – is left undefined.

Conflict resolution work is increasingly becoming intermixed with development projects and the like. Stand alone conflict resolution and peacebuilding efforts are frequently enveloped as part of larger projects focused on governance, economic growth, and rule of law. Encouraging conflict sensitivity within these diverse organizations and projects is replacing those organizations whose sole focus is on conflict resolution/peacebuilding work. Students therefore need to be advocates of conflict sensitivity and process, while possessing an equally deep knowledge of another area like international development, rule of law, etc… What is left unstated but implied is there should be a push within programs to offer dual degrees: conflict resolution + international law, conflict resolution + international development. Being a conflict specialist is just not enough.

Conclusions of the Report

The aforementioned results are undoubtedly interesting, but what exactly do they say? Carstarphen et al. (2010) articulate these different priorities of KSAs as a problematic gap between higher education and the field writ large. That there should be some disagreement as to which KSAs academic programs emphasize and those emphasized by employers is not shocking. What is lamentable is the way the problem has been framed thus far. The blame, which by the way the research question is constructed can only land one place, is heaped firmly upon graduate programs. The solution proposed is to provide students with the training that matches the desired needs of employers: field experience; program management; specialists in a particular sector; cable of working cross-sector while mainstreaming conflict sensitivity; skilled networkers with ins to agencies like the World Bank and USAID; business minded; political savvy; and able to write clear, concise policy briefs and short reports. These are considered desirable skills for professional practice in international conflict work, of which, skills focused on conflict resolution and analysis are perceived of limited use to employers.

In contrast, Carstarphen et al. (2010) indicate a shared sense of frustration from students and faculty toward employer organizations. These concerns are expressed as a lack of understanding on behalf of employers as to what “programs actually teach and prepare students to do and of emerging best practices related to international conflict” (p. 8). Graduates expressed that organizations did not appreciate their skills and many organizations were stuck in old modes of conceptualizing conflict. Additionally, organizations admitted to not being adequately prepared to do international conflict work or knowing how to define what activities should be considered under that heading. It is of little wonder employers find themselves frustrated when they work with a conflict specialist that actually knows something about how conflict manifests itself in various settings throughout the world. Further, the demand that graduates mainstream conflict sensitivity within projects is not greeted with any sense of reciprocity; generalists who bring this sensitivity to their own organizations are not recognized of value. The wide and varied use of terminology within the field of international conflict also translates into a difficulty communicating the same idea in multiple languages across organizational cultures from the U.S. State Department to UNDP to NGOs operating on the ground (See Fast, 2002 for such a discussion on terminology). Finally, conflict specialists operating on the ground have little clout and/or influence over non-conflict trained leaders operating at the policy and decision-making levels.

Four explanations are offered for the gaps between academic programs and employers. First, there is a lack of consensus “as to the appropriate role of academic programs in relation to employers” (Carstarphen et al., p. 9). What is meant by the term appropriate is not explored. Employers want practical skills, but exactly how this universal skill set translates across both sectors and organizations is not discussed. Second, academic programs are constrained in what they can reasonably expect students to complete in terms of course work. The limited number of courses means a greater focus on theory/knowledge and less on skills. Third, students face a difficult situation getting field experience abroad. There is little funding and too few opportunities, especially when the work is unpaid and you are expected to support yourself. Finally, there is a lack of a well-defined, consistent field that comprises international conflict and peace work capable of encompassing all the different tracts under its broad heading. Our diversity means that each academic program and each organization within the field has a vastly different set of ideas and expectations as to the aims of international conflict work.

An Alternate Set of Conclusions

The problem we are left with is not the rather banal recommendations drawn by Carstarphen et al. (2010) for improving graduate education. One would be hard pressed not to agree that changes could be made within field of international conflict education and practice. Moreover, most graduate students and faculty believe there is room for improvement within the field and that there should be more communication between employers and academic programs. Everybody wants practice (a concept that is woefully undefined and under theorized within field), but there are still too few opportunities to engage in it. This is especially true if only international experience is validated. By positioning international experience as the top requirement, graduate programs are asked to fixate on problems on the Other (the site of conflict) and not on factors, like U.S. foreign policy, which may play a major role in generating current conditions on the ground. Exposure to the local population counts for very little when a drone strike can wipe out years of community development work. Subsequently, this demand for international exposure also does not take in to consideration the ethical issues of creating conflict tourism type programs just to meet the demand for students to gain this crucial experience. Places like Cyprus, Northern Ireland and Kosovo suffer from visitor drop-in fatigue as it is already. We should be clear as to how visits from scores of neophyte conflict specialists will help assist or influence peacebuilding efforts in these communities.

Our current engagement questions the recommendations produced by the authors as decidedly in favor of a rather nebulously defined group of employer organizations. A critical lens is more than lacking. In stating that academic programs need to have an appropriate relationship with employers, we are to assume the needs of employers determine what is an appropriate role. According to the employer organizations interviewed, graduate education is not about developing critical thinking skills, but should instead reflect a trade school model aimed at producing docile labor with the temp skills of office workers and the specialized knowledge of a regional/area expert. However, if student and faculty perceptions of employer organizations more accurately reflect the truth about the state of international conflict – that employer organization do not understand factors underlying international conflict and are themselves increasingly becoming party to conflicts by their very positioning – does the problem lie with the graduate students whose education illuminates this quandary out of the hope of correcting it or with the organization operating from a distributive bargaining paradigm from the 1980s?

My intention here is not to shoot the messengers for offering us a critique of graduate education. Nonetheless, I believe this document presents a series of incorrect assumptions about the direction of the field and we should not be lulled into complacency given the potential weight the report carries with decision makers and funders of graduate education. Employers desire a certain type of conflict specialist suited for today’s high turnover environment and skilled at such tasks as writing policy briefs. This is a reflection of trends within the dominant culture which demands ultimate flexibility among labor and the ability to process, synthesize and communicate as much information as possible to the greatest number of people in the shortest amount of time. In this environment, accuracy and complexity always take a back seat to the purported facts, which are discerned free from historical context. There is a constant sense of urgency that demands action over contemplation, “Don’t think, DO!” This report compels us with such a call to action. From it we can speculate as to the consequences of demanding efficiency and technique over depth of thought and relationship building for the field. Those who only read the first page of this report, as many leaders and decision makers are prone to do, will conclude based on the summary that graduate education in international conflict is failing in its aim. Few readers will move past the first page. Even fewer readers will speculate about the sparse number or location of the employer organizations determining this evaluation. And even fewer will critically inquire as to why this report was published as a definitive assessment of graduate education and what the potential implications of such a report mean to the field of international conflict, whose future is being shaped and funded through a U.S. government think tank.

The complaint that academic programs spend too much time on theory is not limited to just to employers. Students and faculty also share the concern that students need real world practice. Yet, what constitutes practice, especially conflict sensitive practice, is highly dependent upon a theoretical understanding of conflict and conflict resolution. Without a solid foundation in theory how does one understand the change they are trying to make in the world or the problems that might arise from using one approach over another? Student comments that employers do not get the implications of theory or best practices should not come as a surprise. As one interviewee is quoted saying, “A lot of employers don’t know they need what we’re doing” (Carstarphen et al., 2010, p. 9). Perhaps employers understand all too well. Theory is dangerous! It has the power to alter perceptions and paradigms, and in some cases start revolutions. While the report proclaimed the need for conflict mainstreaming, which depends on the use of well-articulated peace and conflict theories, we should be hesitant to assert that we have reached a stage in our development where theoretical research is no longer a priority. Mainstreaming Western approaches should be considered with the utmost seriousness for both their potential benefit and potential harm. I will discuss this further in the final section, but I will state now that the ambiguous presentation of international peace and conflict begs the question, what does Western imply? We only need look at gender and development studies to see how quickly good ideas can be reinterpreted to enforce the status quo. Gender mainstreaming is certainly about more than getting white women to be the heads of corporations. There is no question that practice and research are essential in the construction of theory, but it is a fundamental mistake to privilege practice because it makes workflow and employee turnover easier to manage. The challenges of conflict and the pursuit of peace as liberation are messy and complicated activities. Theories cannot be ripped from books and applied directly to ever-changing situations; they must be constantly reinterpreted and retested as history unfolds to help us make sense of the present, the past, and the future.

I do not deny that a specialized knowledge is essential to working with groups in conflict, but that knowledge should be gained from working with the local population. Graduate schools cannot reasonably put students in the middle of dangerous conflicts. Why then should all the weight (and cost) of experience be placed on the shoulders of institutions and individuals, when it is the employer who is working (and profiting) in the particular area? Should employers not be expected to train and invest in their employees by providing them with culturally and regionally specific knowledge one cannot get in the classroom? Students can obviously learn as much as possible about the places they desire to work, but unless they are promised employment before beginning their education how do they know what specific area they will be working in? Only few have the privilege to be both employed in an organization doing international conflict work and to study the conflict they are or will be working on. The vast majority of others come to graduate school and believe that conflict resolution and peacebuilding are priorities for dealing with international and domestic appearances of violence. They want to create new organizations and associations. Some of them may even want to stay within academia, especially those who believe education is the best way to combat violence and persistent poverty. Their theories tell them that when they go out to the field their work should reflect the desires and needs of the local populations. The relationship-centered work of John Paul Lederach (1995) and Marc Gopin (2009) present models for engagement considered hugely important by the field, yet wildly at odds with the employer skills described above, which are designed for dealing with elites and decision makers. We need to be more specific about what groups these changes in conflict training and education are focused at preparing students to work with. Is it local populations or is it state level decision makers? Is the training elicitive or prescriptive based in its approach? How bitter are the graduates trained as conflict specialists and peacebuilders that spend all of their time writing grant applications to only watch the funds disappear into the bowels of the organization? How defeated are local groups funded to do projects and are abandoned when a sexier conflict comes along?

While I more than desire to see changes made in graduate education, starting with academic programs does not alter contradictions at the core of the international peace and conflict economy. Conflict specialists, like the authors of this report, are right to emphasize the need for a greater discussion to take place. That is after all what we conflict specialists pride ourselves in promoting. However, the changes needed are not hierarchical flowing from employers to academic programs. What is needed is a more effective feedback loop from all the parties involved: graduate students, academic programs, employer organizations, and most importantly, communities on the receiving end. The success of graduates, their programs, and organizations working in international conflict should not be based on a single measure determined by employers, but a combined measure of all involved. If the graduates are failing, so are academic programs and employer organizations. Finally, the entirety of this project should be considered as embedded within the context of discourses on globalization and changing relations in production under global capitalism.

Global Ambitions

I will conclude this paper by speculating about the potential dangers of moving forward with such recommendations without keeping a critical eye to the future. There is little doubt that this report speaks volumes about the increasing demand for people with conflict engagement skills and knowledge to work in international conflict. One of the questions I raised at the beginning of this essay dealt with our need to address the unspoken consequences of the field’s dramatic expansion. Carstarphen et al. (2010) write, “the need remains for both academic institutions and employers from the West to identify how best to “export” Western-based conflict resolution theories and practice and make them culturally and contextually appropriate and to develop improved practice and models based on local practices” (p. 10). In prioritizing the exportation of “Western” based conflict resolution adapted to local sensitivities as a site where academic programs and employers can build common ground, the authors return us to the sphere of neoliberal ambition. As a result of their methodological considerations, when we read Western in this report we are forced to insert United States. The programs and organizations involved are not representative of a global movement to adopt a shared vision of conflict knowledge and practices. Instead, the failure of academic programs is based on the demands of primarily U.S. organizations and U.S. international conflict programs. This raises scores of important questions not touched by the report, due in part, to the limitations imposed by its authors. Carstarphen et al. leave themselves unable to critique the contradictions discovered in their own research. If there is such a lag between academic theory and organizations operating in the field, is pushing for the exportation of Western-based conflict practice going to alleviate the contradictions of a field so broadly defined? What if part of the problem within conflict zones is the international peace and conflict economy that springs up as a result with hundreds of NGOs competing for a limited pool of resources? The demands of the World Bank, far from bringing hope and prosperity, are themselves catalyst for conflict. We, as a field, must be more critical about how our knowledge and practices are being implemented on a global scale.

The spread of Western centered conflict resolution practices places us within what Hardt and Negri (2000) would describe as the imperial ambitions of global capital. The critique is not limited to the Left alone. Realists like Mearsheimer (2011) also see imperial folly writ large in the behavior of U.S. foreign policy over the last few decades. The movement within advanced industrial societies, particularly in the West, from industrial labor to biopower reflects a major shift in the relations of production. It does not negate old class antagonisms or transcend them, but instead reveals a new focus on capital’s and by extension neoliberalism’s fixation on managing human relations. We should by hyperaware of studies, such as this report, when the results originate from an organization funded by the United States at a time when the country was involved in two wars (Afghanistan and Iraq). The demand for conflict specialists of a specific sort in 2005 can be read as the desire to find new ways of trying to manage two failing military operations. The introduction of U.S. military’s counterinsurgency strategy and the expanded use of provisional reconstruction teams (PRTs) are profound examples of the incorporation of conflict resolution into U.S. foreign policy. Certainly, we can be both critical and supportive of such a shift in the U.S. policy. The ability impose a human rights agenda as a global concept is after all much needed given how little value life was accorded during that last century. Yet in true dialectical fashion, this usurpation of national sovereignty under the weight of questionable, if not illegal military action should not be seen as a golden opportunity for conflict specialists. The lack of recognizable distance between invader, occupying force, development worker and conflict specialist casts doubt upon the entire conflict resolution project’s aim, especially when power is transferred into the hands of administrators and practitioners whose primary interest is the agenda of the market economy vis-à-vis the United States. Since class antagonisms remain unresolved under global capitalism, the distance between the ownership class and the rest continues to grow. The demand for specific forms of development guided by the World Bank, including the privatization of common land and resources, exacerbates already tense conditions. Conflict resolution theories and practices are inserted into this volatile mix. The resultant silence found within the majority of the field to contest global capitalism’s exploitative and conflict generating tendencies can be read as a trade-off for the ability to work in said areas. The implications of this trade-off are beyond the scope this inquiry, but the assertion that graduate students are not adequately prepared to work in the field might, in contrast, be the perceptiveness of said students to the contradictions inherent between the liberatory aspirations of conflict resolution and the neoliberal ambitions of certain organizations within the development and security sectors.

Works Cited:

Carstarphen, N., Zelizer, C., Harris, R., & Smith, D. J. (2010). Graduate Education and Professional Practice in International Peace and Conflict.  http://www.usip.org/publications/graduate-education-and-professional-pra...

Fast, L. A. (2002). Frayed Edges: Exploring the Boundaries of Conflict Resolution. Peace and Change, 27(4), 528-545. doi:10.1111/1468-0130.00243

Gopin, M. (2009). To Make the Earth Whole: The Art of Citizen Diplomacy in an Age of Religious Militancy. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.

Hardt, M., & Negri, A. (2000). Empire. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press.

Harvey, D. (2005). A Brief History of Neoliberalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Lederach, J. P. (1995). Preparing for Peace: Conflict Transformation Across Cultures. Syracuse studies on peace and conflict resolution. Syracuse, N.Y: Syracuse University Press.

Mearsheimer, J. (2011). Imperial by Design. The National Interest, Jan.-Feb. http://nationalinterest.org/issue/jan-feb-2011