Lacanflict

This article explores Jacques Lacan’s four discourses (Master, University, Hysteric and Analyst) and places them in the context of conflict resolution. This article begins a discussion of what Lacanian thought can do to help the analysis and practice of conflict resolution. Furthermore, there are certain existential problems within the field that are raised by the Lacanian perspective in Conflict Resolution.

Keywords: Lacan, Conflict Resolution, Analysis, Critical Theory, Conflict, Burton

Conflict[i] appears to be a basic component of human interaction[ii]: ” conflict is a generic phenomenon that knows no system boundaries.”[iii] Furthermore, as Maire Dugan’s “nested model of conflict”[iv] illustrates, conflict is not only beyond boundaries, but transcendent of boundaries; conflict is therefore a product of human interaction with others and the systems that these interactions create. In order for conflicts to exist, there must be a self/other distinction; this would then mean that there could be no internal ‘conflict.’ However, internal conflict is well known, which means that: there is a problem with an inconsistent definition: It may be that the way in which ‘conflict’ is used when talking about the internal is inconsistent with how ‘conflict’ is used when discussing the external; or, the definition itself is flawed—it is the same phenomenon described, only the definition is incorrectly accurate; or, the self is not the most basic aspect of the person—the self is an other through which engagement in the world is acted out. Each of these solutions to the problem of conflict as generic and transcendental phenomena have their own issues, however, the one that answers best with the least amount of external complications is the third: the self as an other. This distinction of the self as an other, is a realization made by Jacques Lacan; the explanation as how this happens, and the implications for conflict are what follows.

Jacque Lacan’s observations of children aged 6-18 months informed him, as well as others before him, that at some point a child becomes able to recognize the self in a mirror, or that the self is different from all else: the self exists where everything else ceases to be:

"For the total form of his body, by which the subject anticipates the maturation of his power in a mirage, is given to him only as a gestalt, that is, in an exteriority in which, to be sure, this form is more constitutive than constituted…. this gestalt, whose power [prégnance] should be considered linked to the species… symbolises the I‘s mental permanence, at the same time as it prefigures its alienating destination."[v]

Thus, the mirror stage functions to “establish a relationship between an organism and it’s reality,” to mediate “between the Innenwelt and the Umwelt.”[vi][vii] Beyond basic recognition of the self as distinct from the world, and is thus the genesis of the individual, it positions the I as an other (and necessarily in the imaginary world)[viii]: the self as reflected in the mirror, is not the true self, it is a symbol[ix] for the self—a vehicle through which the true self interacts with the world at once alien and familiar; a border zone. As a Freudian, Lacan sees the ego (self) as an object: “an artificial projection of the subjective unity modelled on the visual images of objects and others that the individual confronts in the world.”[x] Furthermore, Lacan (as Freud before him) thought that it is the identification with the ego that underlies aggression in humans. Therefore, as the self is an object formed and created through interaction in the world, intrapersonal conflicts are merely attempts at reconciling the ‘true self’ with the ‘self object!’[xi] Furthermore, through Lacan, the principle definition of conflict, which Burton used, still holds in the intrapersonal context as well as any other context.

It is from the mirror stage that the self develops;[xii] and early in development is desire. For Lacan, desire is the desire of the other,[xiii] and that human beings must learn how to desire, or “It is only through fantasy that the subject is constituted as desiring: through fantasy, we learn how to desire.”[xiv] This theory does not wholly deny Burtonian basic human needs, rather it adds to it by explaining how cultural inconsistencies arise through the navigation of structure and the communities of others: how false needs may become imperative desires that appear as needs within the culture.[xv] However, for Lacan, it is not merely satisfaction of basic needs that are important, but how those needs become mediated by social exchanges and translate into desire. “Lacan articulates this decentring of desire” by asserting biological needs “become inseparable from, and importantly subordinated to, the vicissitudes of its demand for the recognition and love of other people.”[xvi] Furthermore, for Lacan, desires are created by discourse and expressed through language; therefore, every desire needs a symbol. A Therefore, at At the same moment that the child is introduced to the realm of the imaginary (where the self is also other), s/he is also introduced to the symbolic world:[xvii] the ‘self other’ becomes symbolic of the ‘true self;’ and an object of desire. “The price that is paid for the Symbolisation is thus the loss of the primordial object, the object a, the object of desire. What remains is an emptiness, a trace, something reminding of a fullness.”[xviii]

Through the radical creation of the symbolic and imaginary, there is created a distinction between self (which is really imaginary and other) and the other (which is symbolic and not self). For this distinction Lacan uses objet a for the ‘self other,’ and A, for the ‘other other.’ Objet a exists entirely in the imaginary order as a projection of the Ego.[xix] Whereas A, is the radical alterity, which exists in the symbolic order, as each A has its own uniqueness transcendent of the imaginary order that may not be assimilated.[xx] It is through the discourse between objet a and A, that conflicts arise.[xxi]

Conflicts are created in the process of symbolisation; the creation of symbols (or language itself) is the method in which we attempt to create order; as such, order is not inherent, but imposed. This means that symbols (language and cultural artefacts) are forever cut off from nature.[xxii] Furthermore, we attempt to create order as we attempt to regain the object that was forever lost when the symbolic and imaginary were created: the Real. The real is that which is presocial and prelinguistic; it cannot be described (at least with any accurately) in language. For Lacan, the real does not represent reality, it represents wholeness that is lost in the creation of self and through development of knowledge.[xxiii] “In sum, we can say that the Real is that which comes before Symbolisation, and which provokes desire. When it is approached too closely, it is a horrifying reality, but it also makes Symbolisation possible.”[xxiv] Desire, just as conflict, can manifest itself in awesome horrifyingly destructive ways, as well as sublime beautifully creative ways.

Lacan speculated that the world operated through the process of symbolization: the Real becoming the Imaginary Order producing the Symbolic Order that creates the Real. As society operates, so too the subconscious.[xxv] It is reasonable to assume that the subconscious and the outer social world are not operating in complete ignorance of each other; that these two processes of symbolization are both informed and informing one another, akin to Gidden’s ‘double hermeneutic.’[xxvi] Conflict then occurs between individuals and structures when the processes by which meaning/order is created do not mesh. Lacan called the processes of how meaning/order is created discourse, of which there were four types: the University; the Master; the Hysteric; the Analyst.[xxvii] Where Lacan’s analysis focused primarily on the intrapersonal conflict that manifests as personality traits, disorders, etc., etc., the rest of this essay applies the internal discourses to social scenarios and groups as a method of analysis and explanation of conflict and conflict generating systems.

Lacan illustrated the discourses through an algebraic formula with four symbols: S1 the transcendental signifier, or “the principle that controls signification and significance”—it is the power/structure that decides true (productive) and false (unproductive)[xxviii]; S2 the chain signifiers—these are the speech acts, cultural norms, rituals and discourses of society[xxix]; $, the divided subject, represents the subject forever removed from the real, it is powerless and caught between S1 and a[xxx]; a, the object of desire—this is the substitute desire for that which was lost when the imaginary and symbolic order were created.[xxxi] Each symbol relates directly to two other symbols (the one directly across on the same plane, as well as the one either above or below) but influences all symbols in the system. Each Lacanian discourse is different; therefore each discourse can explain something different about conflict, and perhaps its resolution.

The first discourse, the discourse of the Master, is understood as the “tyranny of the all knowing and exclusion of fantasy.”[xxxii] In this discourse, the power/structure that decides what is true (S1) is given primacy, and the divided self ($) retreats beneath this power/structure. The purpose of this discourse is in production (reproduction) of Culture, knowledge and society (S2) against the objet a, the unknowable object of desire (the ultimate reality).

The Discourse of the Master

S1  ->  S2

 $          a

The Master discourse expects reproduction of his/her mastery and interaction with the world of the Master discourse is domineering and inherently violent to those not in the seat of power. Furthermore, this discourse, by supplanting the objet a, expects that the reproduction of certain commodities is the ultimate goal; therefore what creates ‘the good.’ Reproduction of the power/structure is what matters most, and not whether or not this is a joyful or painful process.

The retreat of the divided subject, means that this discourse is devoid of fantasy—bereft of fantasy, there can be no disagreement, as if it does not fit the reproduction of power/structure, then it is wrong: this is a world of stark black and white. Furthermore, there is no need for disagreement as the master has arrived to truth, and thus becomes a champion of the ‘truth,’ whether that ‘truth’ is progressive or conservative. The master discourse excels at producing ideology and other commodities, however, through the subjugation of the divided self and the objet a, surplus jouissance[xxxiii] is created. As jouissance builds up, pleasure decreases; in order for enjoyment to be, it must be used, otherwise it creates pain. This discourse as a social force may be exemplified in its extreme as fascism, capitalist production, and Stalinist purges; more benignly this discourse appears in agents of schools, workforces and the law that force uncritical reproduction of power/structure. The Master discourse creates violence any place where there is power asymmetry; therefore, to reduce violence, society should either attempt to change (or at least limit) this discourse in places of power, or seek to balance power (thus reducing the violence generated).

The discourse of the University places primacy in the culture, ritual, discourse and meaning making practices (S2) and the power/structure (S1) retreats below. The aim of this discourse is to produce “knowledge as the ultimate object of desire (a), over and against”[xxxiv] the divided self ($). This is the discursive realm of empowerment and learning techniques for the production of knowledge: Critical Theory, close reading, historical context. This discourse strives for competency and accountability to the larger context of society (academic discipline, state, or world).

The Discourse of the University

S2  ->   a

S1        $

While no external pressures of conformity and reproduction exist and the agent is free to exercise creativity, there is not any needed: disciplinary forces exist which self police; being responsible to all means that mistakes are felt by all, therefore poor knowledge production can have serious unforeseen side effects. This responsibility and the disciplinary pressure can lead to paralysis or perfectionism (and the violence of utopia). In this discourse, the objet a appears to be just beyond reach, and through production of knowledge, it appears to come incrementally closer. However, no matter how much closer to the objet a one tries to get, the objet a appears to still loom just out of reach. Combined with the responsibility to the collective, this lack of ability attain the objet a, at sometimes great personal cost, can lead to feelings of guilt, or cynicism: why couldn’t I achieve? Is it even possible, why try? In order to mitigate the violence of this discourse as it tends toward destruction (self destruction), it becomes necessary to prop up the divided self—it is the complete subjugation of that self which designs the violence of this discourse!

The Hysteric’s discourse however, is one that places primacy of the divided self ($) over ultimate desire (a); this discourse produces power/structure that dominates the meaning making systems. The discourse of the hysteric is “‘unrealistic’, paranoid, delusional, hypochondriac, unstable and fluxatious, troublesome. Hysteria violates textual and disciplinary codes, rules, conventions, modes of production, technologies of knowledge, discursive bounds or limits.”[xxxvii]

The Discourse of the Hysteric

$  ->  S1

a       S2

In the discourse of Hysteria, the symptom takes the place of real production: spurious claims are perceived as realities, and the ego’s drive to make ‘worthwhile’ contribution forces the hysteric to push their agenda upon the power/structure that subordinates the meaning making systems. The hysteric challenges subjectivity through misdirection, or atopical responses that have “the effect of alienating us from the certainties of knowledge and identity that we tend to buy into as we go about our daily business.”[xxxviii] In this discourse, desire takes on the role of threatening the “construct of subjectivity” [xxxix] and belongs to the divided subject that has failed under a meaning making system: the hysteric may be therefore understood as a sort of heretic. Furthermore, it the rules of the meaning making system that are part of the problem, and therefore must be destroyed. The hysteric was created through violence that caused him/her to fail; therefore, the hysteric enacts violence as a means of legitimating the self against the violence perpetrated. The hysteric may be seen in the violent anarchy of Batman’s the Joker, or in the conspiracy oriented Glenn Beck. Furthermore, while the discourse of the hysteric is an individualistic discourse, it may be the agent driving force behind a Master discourse.[xl] Therefore, hysterics should be dealt with (in order to understand the violence done to them)[xli] in order to turn the discourse (and heal the violence), prior to him/her potentially taking control of a Master discourse.

For Lacan, it is at the moment of the Hysteric’s question that the Analyst discourse must be the reply. The Analyst has the responsibility to listen to the hysteric, and help to mediate whether the hysteric is legitimate in decrying symptoms or not. The Analyst discourse places the objet a (the object of desire) as prime over the meaning making systems (S2). The product of the Analyst discourse is the divided subject over the power/structure.

The Discourse of the Analyst

 a  ->  $

S2     S1

The discourse of the Analyst is a necessarily independent discourse. Furthermore, for Lacan, this discourse must come after the discourse of the hysteric. If this is the discourse best suited for conflict resolution, as it is the ethical realm concerned with equality and alterity, what does that mean for the field? In the first instance, it suggests that conflict resolution must itself remain independent of the power/structure, i.e. not attaché to the state. Second, it suggests that true resolution and social justice can only happen after conflict. The second proposition is the more troubling one as it negates the potential for preconflict resolution; that necessarily, the hysteric must be pushed into action before work may begin. Furthermore, this is troublesome as for many in the field of conflict resolution, it is unacceptable to just wait for the next conflict to arise: after all, are we just supposed to sit around and wait for another Rwanda, another Holocaust? No. For two reasons, this is false: First, there is time between the discourse of Hysteria and genocide or directly violent attacks; second, we are living in conflict,[xliii] the first hysterics spoke long ago and their discourses continue to have effect in this world—if we as conflict resolutionaries wish to prevent conflict, then we must listen to the ancient Hysterics and respond through the discourse of the Analyst:

 a  ->  $

S2     S1

1. Be mindful of the Master’s discourse and how much control you give it.

This does not mean necessarily that good works are impossible within the state bureaucracy, only that conflict resolution is impossible. Furthermore, it does not imply that you are unable to take government money to do your work, only that the state may not have any real control over what you do with those funds, and that the work you do with that money is necessarily tainted by influence from the Masters discourse.

2. Understand the role of the University discourse and what it can do for practice.

The University discourse generates and explores for new knowledge. Therefore, practitioners should be reading from and contributing to the body of knowledge that the Academics pull from. Furthermore, Academics should be doubly mindful of what techniques actually work in the field (e.g. just because something is theoretically sound, does not mean it is practical or prudent). It is incredibly possible for the University and Analyst discourses to have productive and creative interplay.

3. Listen openly and intently to the Hysterics. Their voices may not be grounded in any familiar reality, but they may very well be pointing to real issues that give rise to conflict.

As discussed before, that Hysteric discourse when coupled with a Master’s discourse can become incredibly destructive. However, the symptoms that the hysteric is raving about are grounded in a perception of the world; there was some act that generated that perception, and it is possible that there is something within that act that is caustic, though it will undoubtedly be not what the hysteric believes!

4. Primacy in the objet a over meaning making practices

The unattainable object of desire, objet a should be supported by meaning making practices. Ritual should not be hollow actions, there should be personal inspiration behind them. Art, music and personal faith are examples this practice, whereas the converse of this exists when religion is institutionalized and dogma is created, or when art and music become commodified.

5. Primacy of the Divided Self over Power/Structure

When art and music are created for the purpose of expressing the soul, and genuine emotions, or when individual faith leads a person to live compassion for humanity, then the divided self is in control over power/structure. Art and music are able to survive (as well as combat) totalitarianism; genuine personal faith are capable of inspiring people to stand in the face of power and speak truth regardless of the consequences. Power/Structure is not legitimate because it is powerful, but because the divided self submits to it.

These steps seems simple enough on paper, but the challenge is to live them. Remember your heroes. Be your heroes.

Works Cited:

Admin. “What Does Lacan Say about the Mirror Stage – Part I,” http://www.lacanonline.com/index/2010/09/what-does-lacan-say-about-the-m... (December 13, 2010)

Burton, John W. “Conflict Resolution: The Human Dimension,” The International Journal of Peace Studies, 3(1), 1998 http://www.gmu.edu/programs/icar/ijps/vol3_1/burton.htm (December 13, 2010)

Burton, John W. “Conflict Resolution as a Political Philosophy” Conflict Resolution Theory and Practice: Integration and Application. Ed. Dennis J. D. Sandole and Hugo van der Merwe. Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 1993

Dugan, Maire. “A Nested Theory of Conflict,” Women in Leadership 1, no.1, summer 1996

Foucault, Michel. Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, Vintage, 1995

Giddens, Anthony. “Hermeneutics and Social Theory,” Hermeneutics: Questions and Prospects (Gary Shapiro, Alan Sica, ed), Univ of Massachusetts Press, 1989

Lacan, Jacques. Ecrits: The First Complete Edition in English, edited by Bruce Fink

Lacan, Jacques. “The Other Side of Psychoanalysis,” The Seminar of Jacques Lacan Book XVII, Norton, (2007)

Lederach, John Paul. Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies. Washington, D.C. U.S. Institute of Peace Press. 1997

McMahon, Christopher Rober. “Hysterical Academies: Lacan’s Theory of the Four Discourses,” The International Journal: Language, Culture, and Society, 2 (1997) http://www.educ.utas.edu.au/users/tle/JOURNAL/Articles/McMahon/McMahon.html (December 13, 2010)

Sharpe, Matthew. “Jacques Lacan (1901-1981)” Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, http://www.iep.utm.edu/lacweb/ (December 13, 2010)

Zizek, Slavoj. “An Introduction to the Ideas of Jacques Lacan,” lacan.com (December 13, 2010)

Zizek, Slavoj. Looking Awry: An Introduction to Jacques Lacan through Popular Culture, October Books, (1992)

Notes:
[i] John W. Burton, “Conflict Resolution: The Human Dimension,” The International Journal of Peace Studies, 3(1), 1998 http://www.gmu.edu/programs/icar/ijps/vol3_1/burton.htm (December 13, 2010) In this article, Burton agrees with Morgenthau’s distinction between dispute and conflict.

[ii] Please note: the author does not believe that conflict is inherently negative, but existing in both negative and positive aspects.

[iii] John W. Burton, “Conflict Resolution as a Political Philosophy” Conflict Resolution Theory and Practice: Integration and Application. Ed. Dennis J. D. Sandole and Hugo van der Merwe. Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 1993: p. 56

[iv] Maire Dugan, “A Nested Theory of Conflict,” Women in Leadership 1, no.1, summer 1996 and John Paul Lederach Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies. Washington, D.C. U.S. Institute of Peace Press. 1997, pp. 55-57

[v] Jacque Lacan, “Ecrits: The First Complete Edition in English,” edited by Bruce Fink, 95.

[vi] Innenvelt and umvelt essentially mean inner world (psyche) and outerworld (environment).

[vii] Ibid.

[viii] Slavoj Zizek, “An Introduction to the Ideas of Jacques Lacan,” lacan.com (December 13, 2010)

[ix] Lacan later refines this concept to mean not just a visual image, but any symbolic aspect that the true self identifies with.

[x] Admin. “What Does Lacan Say about the Mirror Stage – Part I,” http://www.lacanonline.com/index/2010/09/what-does-lacan-say-about-the-m... (December 13, 2010)

[xi] It may be reasonable to assert that it is the inability to ever know (though the desire exists) our true self that is the cause of much of our intrapersonal crises.

[xii] The self is not a presocial being, but is created through socialization once development has reached a certain stage.

[xiii] Jacques Lacan, “The Other Side of Psychoanalysis,” The Seminar of Jacques Lacan Book XVII, Norton, (2007) 38; 61.

[xiv] Slavoj Zizek, “Looking Awry: An Introduction to Jacques Lacan through Popular Culture,” October Books, (1992) 6.

[xv] Burtonian human needs theory essentially stated that there exists a set of predisoursive and universal human needs which are the root of all conflicts. Therefore, conflict arises from the lack of satisfaction of basic human needs, and were basic human needs satisfied there would cease to be conflict.

[xvi] Matthew Sharpe, “Jacques Lacan (1901-1981)” Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, http://www.iep.utm.edu/lacweb/ (December 13, 2010)

[xvii] Slavoj Zizek, “An Introduction to the Ideas of Jacques Lacan,” lacan.com (December 13, 2010)

[xviii] Slavoj Zizek, “An Introduction to the Ideas of Jacques Lacan,” lacan.com (December 13, 2010)

[xix] Ibid.

[xx] Ibid.

[xxi] Lacan Rearticulates the Oedipus complex, as well as the symbol of the phallus to describe a primary intrapersonal conflict in childhood development. This conflict, while intrapersonal, develops from interaction on the symbolic order with A; furthermore it illustrates the method in which intrapersonal conflict may manifest external to the self, thus reinforcing Maire Dugan’s model.

[xxii] Ibid.

[xxiii] The real can be expressed further through a story in the Torah: The Expulsion From the Garden of Eden. In eating of the fruit from the tree of knowledge, Adam and Woman are plunged into the world of imaginary and symbolic (where they discover desire); forever removed from the Real.

[xxiv] Slavoj Zizek, “An Introduction to the Ideas of Jacques Lacan,” lacan.com (December 13, 2010)

[xxv] Ibid.

[xxvi] Anthony Giddens “Hermeneutics and Social Theory,” Hermeneutics: Questions and Prospects (Gary Shapiro, Alan Sica, ed), Univ of Massachusetts Press, 1989: 221

[xxvii] Jacques Lacan, “The Other Side of Psychoanalysis,” The Seminar of Jacques Lacan Book XVII, Norton, (2007) 43.

[xxviii] Christopher Robert McMahon, “Hysterical Academies: Lacan’s Theory of the Four Discourses,” The International Journal: Language, Culture, and Society, 2 (1997) http://www.educ.utas.edu.au/users/tle/JOURNAL/Articles/McMahon/McMahon.html (December 13, 2010)

[xxix] Ibid.

[xxx] Ibid.

[xxxi] Ibid.

[xxxii] Ibid.

[xxxiii] Jouissance is the pleasure that exists beyond the limits of pleasure. Pleasure must be used as it is created, otherwise there is an excess that creates jouissance. Similar to electronic circuitry, pleasure may be overloaded.

[xxxiv] Christopher Robert McMahon, “Hysterical Academies: Lacan’s Theory of the Four Discourses,” The International Journal: Language, Culture, and Society, 2 (1997) http://www.educ.utas.edu.au/users/tle/JOURNAL/Articles/McMahon/McMahon.html (December 13, 2010)

[xxxv] Ibid.

[xxxvi] Michel Foucault, “Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison,” Vintage, 1995

[xxxvii] Christopher Robert McMahon, “Hysterical Academies: Lacan’s Theory of the Four Discourses,” The International Journal: Language, Culture, and Society, 2 (1997) http://www.educ.utas.edu.au/users/tle/JOURNAL/Articles/McMahon/McMahon.html (December 13, 2010)

[xxxviii] Christopher Robert McMahon, “Hysterical Academies: Lacan’s Theory of the Four Discourses,” The International Journal: Language, Culture, and Society, 2 (1997) http://www.educ.utas.edu.au/users/tle/JOURNAL/Articles/McMahon/McMahon.html (December 13, 2010)

[xxxix] Ibid.

[xl] Nazi Germany may be understood as a Master discourse with a Hysteric at the helm. The Hysteric created the symptom that the Master discourse then reproduced. Please note: The author is not attempting to link Beck and Hitler, or make any claims that they are the same, or equally as dangerous.

[xli] The Hysteric’s questions are not inherently destructive, or negative. The hysteric sometimes has the liberty to ask questions that get right to the root of the problem; the only issue arises in understanding when the hysteric is true, or not.

[xlii] Christopher Robert McMahon, “Hysterical Academies: Lacan’s Theory of the Four Discourses,” The International Journal: Language, Culture, and Society, 2 (1997) http://www.educ.utas.edu.au/users/tle/JOURNAL/Articles/McMahon/McMahon.html (December 13, 2010)

[xliii] Conflict is the prime move of consciousness: if we recall the mirror stage, then with the loss of wholeness (the Real), the self is thrust into conflict being of nature but forever more removed from nature experiencing the world in the symbolic and imaginary. We are Adam and Woman, living East of Eden perpetually wishing for a return that is impossible.